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ABSTRACT
SCHOOL QUALITY, HOUSE PRICES, AND LIQUIDITY: THE
EFFECTS OF PUBLIC SCHOOL REFORM IN BATON ROUGE
By
VELMA ZAHIROVIC-HERBERT
May 2007

Committee Chair: Dr. Geoffrey K. Turnbull
Major Department: Economics

After a court imposed desegregation plan ended in 1996, the Baton Rouge, Louisiana
school district created neighborhood attendance zones for its schools, followed by a series of
attendance zone changes. We use data from 1994 to 2002 to examine the impact of changes in
school characteristics on simultaneous determination of house prices and liquidity in the market.
A simultaneous equations model of sales price and tine-on-market is adopted that extends the
hedonic price model by controlling for localized neighborhood market conditions. Our empirical
results show that improving and declining school performance can have asymmetric
capitalization effects. Further, as indicated by the search-market model, liquidity absorbs part of
the capitalization of school quality; for example, declining school performance prolongs houses’
marketing time.

xii
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Chapter 1: School Quality, House Prices, and Liquidity—The Effects of Public School
Reform in Baton Rouge
A house is typically a person's largest asset, and the quality of local public schools is
often a major consideration when a family with school-age children looks for a house to buy. To
attract potential house buyers, real estate agents prominently feature which school district a
house is in along with other characteristics such as the features of the house and proximity to
parks, shopping, etc. Since information on schools is readily available to the public, house
buyers can easily include school quality in their assessment of a house’s value. With so much
importance given toward housing and public schools, any relationship between them merits
investigation.
This dissertation uses data from East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana, from 1994 through
2002 to study the relationship between property values and school performance and school racial
composition. While numerous studies look at house buyers’ valuations of school quality, there
has been little emphasis on which measures of school quality they consider when making choices
about where they live and how that affects their children’s education. In addition, this research
investigates the impact of school performance and school racial composition on liquidity.
Liquidity is a property of an asset that reflects how long traders must wait in order to
trade at market prices. Most theories of asset pricing, based on modeling financial assets,
assume that assets are perfectly liquid since buyers and sellers are matched instantaneously.
However, the matching process between buyers and sellers can be quite slow in the residential
housing market. By taking into account the interrelationship between selling prices and time-onmarket, this dissertation provides a more complete analysis of the impact of changes in school
characteristics on the housing market than previous research offers.

2
Many studies have examined property values in order to assess the value people place on
the quality of local public services and property taxes.1 Most of the studies that are concerned
with school quality use the data on housing sales transactions and regress them on a measure of
school quality. Studies such as Haurin and Brasington (1996), Hayes and Taylor (1996), and
Black (1999) measure school quality through standardized test scores. Using cross-sectional
analysis, they show a positive relationship between test scores and housing prices.
Yet, in addition to test scores, parents care about the peer effects and the environment in
which their children are learning (Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2002; Hoxby, 2000). A school
environment can be characterized by factors that include socio-economic and demographic
composition of the student body. While Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002), and Hoxby (2000)
examine peer effects and their relation to school performance, few recent studies consider direct
student peer effects as measured by the socio-economic characteristics of the students in the
school and their impact on house values. For example, Weimer and Wolkoff (2001) use the
percent of an elementary school’s student body that receives reduced-price lunch to show that
excluding this factor substantially increase the coefficients for elementary test scores. A more
recent study by Clapp, Nanda, and Ross (2005) finds strong evidence that the percentage of
Hispanic students and the percentage of free lunch students have significant long-run negative
effects on house values.
The hedonic price model and conventional capitalization theory suggest that the value of
the characteristics of a house is fully capitalized into the house price. In the short run, the supply
of owner occupied housing is fixed and the market response to demand shocks should be

1

Ross and Yinger (1999) provide a review of the empirical literature on the capitalization of public service quality
and property taxes into house prices.

3
symmetric: positive shocks resulting in price increases and negative shocks resulting in price
decreases. However, these markets typically respond to large negative demand shocks with long
periods during which asset liquidity declines but house prices change relatively little.2 A few
studies examine the impact of locational amenities on selling time.3 It is well recognized that
there is a tradeoff between an acceptable price and the time a seller has a house on the market
(Belkin, Hempel, & McLeavey, 1976; Haurin, 1988). Nevertheless, previous housing market
studies examine locational amenities’ impact either on property values or on selling time. The
simultaneous determination of sales price and time-on-market is overlooked in estimating the
benefits of locational amenities. Failure to account for the simultaneity of the time-price
relationship can result in biased estimates of different attributes that affect house prices.
In sum, the impact of public policies that alter locational amenities such as neighborhood
school quality needs to be examined through not only sales prices but also the liquidity of the
housing market.
Several events make East Baton Rouge Parish an ideal place to study the effect of school
test scores and school racial composition on housing prices and time-on-market. First, under a
court-imposed desegregation plan in place from 1981 through 1996, the district imposed random
school assignments, which resulted in mandatory busing for its students. In an effort to achieve
racial balance, formerly white and formerly black schools were paired or clustered, and students
were bused to their clusters based on the need to create racial balance. These kinds of
desegregation orders created strong public resistance and a migration of white students from the
public school system. Finally, 15 years after court-ordered random school assignments started,

2

Stein (1995) and Genesove and Mayer (1997) explain the decline in asset liquidity that follows a negative demand
shock by sellers being equity constrained.
3
Nelson (1982) reviews studies that look into impact of highway noise on property values and selling time.
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the district adopted a plan that eliminated random school assignment in favor of “community
sensitive” attendance zones, which were drawn to maximize a sense of community and
ownership of the schools.4 The move to community sensitive attendance zones implies that the
school attended by the student is strictly determined by residence location. For the period of
random school assignments, school quality cannot be considered a locational amenity, yet when
school attendance is determined by residence location, we can include school quality as one of
the measures of locational amenities.
Second, because the district tried to promote racial desegregation, it implemented a series
of attendance zone changes that included different neighborhoods often segregated along racial
lines. Changes in attendance zones, or redistricting, affected the housing market in two ways.
First, many houses were assigned to new schools, changing their locational attributes. Second,
even for those houses that had stable school assignments, changes in attendance zones
boundaries in other neighborhoods led to large changes in the characteristics of the students
assigned to their schools.
It is often difficult to provide statistical evidence in the social sciences because most
events are generated by actions that people undertake deliberately. We argue that events that
occurred in East Baton Rouge Parish provide a rare opportunity to study how a sudden
exogenous change in public policy impacts the housing market. The changes in school
assignments implemented by East Baton Rouge Parish School System are a natural experiment
in education policy. The school district was operating under a court-imposed desegregation
order. This desegregation order caused changes in the housing market locational amenities in the
form of test scores and school demographic composition. Such exogenous change allows us to

4

Consent Decree, page 2.
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use classical statistical theory that works only if variations in data occur randomly. The
uniqueness of our data set and empirical methodology avoid common difficulties in housing
market studies. While looking within one school district enables us to eliminate variations in
property tax rates, school spending, and other public services, two different sources of variation
along boundaries of school attendance zones and following the change in school assignments
provide for an ideal situation to study the effects of school quality measures and racial
composition on housing prices. Similarly, controls for the localized housing market supply and
demand conditions ensure that price and time-on-market equations are identified in the 2SLS
estimation, and remove a potential source of spatial correlation in housing data.
This dissertation uses a unique data set to provide the first empirical study that considers
the impact of changes in school quality on simultaneous determination of selling price and timeon-market in an empirical environment that controls for the neighborhood supply and demand
conditions. By taking into account the interrelationship between prices and time-on-market, this
dissertation provides a complete estimate of the impact of changes in school characteristics on
housing market. The dissertation offers empirical evidence relevant to answering the following
questions. What is a good school worth? Which school characteristics do parents find most
important when examining school quality? How is the housing market affected by public policy
that changes school quality? How does a change in school quality impact both components of
the housing market: selling price and liquidity?
The dissertation is organized as follows; Chapter 2 presents the background information
on the history of school desegregation in East Baton Rouge Parish. Its main focus is the events
that took place after the end of court-ordered mandatory busing and their impact on school racial
composition.
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Chapter 3 is concerned with the capitalization of different measures of school quality. Its
purpose is to evaluate the effect of the end of court ordered school desegregation on housing
prices using traditional hedonic price models. First, it presents the review of literature that
examines capitalization of public services in owner occupied houses. Second, it lays out the
theoretical framework and model that relaxes the assumption of a vertical supply curve for the
stock of housing. This is an essential assumption for the bid rent model adopted here and in
previous studies as the basis for estimation. In the section that reviews the data and methodology
implemented, we discuss the importance of adequately measuring the quality of the
neighborhood and school, and separating those two effects. We estimate different specifications
of hedonic price models and use Black’s (1999) approach focusing on differences in housing
price effects near attendance zone boundaries. In focusing on school boundaries, we assume that
unobserved factors affecting house prices are not systematically correlated with school test
scores across the boundaries themselves. However, residential choice models imply that there
would be considerable sorting along these stable school boundaries.5 For example, families who
are willing to pay more to live in a school attendance area with better schools may be better
educated and have higher income. Even if houses and neighborhoods are very similar on either
side of a school attendance boundary when the boundary is initially established, the resemblance
may not last long as properties are traded in the market. To the extent that this sorting occurs, it
biases boundary estimates toward finding a positive relationship between school quality and
property value. Nevertheless, the uniqueness of our data allows us to focus on the time period

5

Using an equilibrium model of residential sorting, Bayer, Fferreria, and McMillian (2004) provides clear evidence
that the full effect of school quality on residential sorting is significantly larger than the direct effect -- four times as
great for education stratification, twice for income stratification. This is due to a strong social multiplier associated
with heterogeneous preferences for peers and neighbors; initial changes in school quality set in motion a process of
re-sorting on the basis of neighborhood characteristics that reinforces itself, giving rise to substantially larger
stratification effects
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when the move to community-sensitive attendance zones is originally implemented and include
school quality as one of the measures of locational attributes while controlling for the possibility
of this type of residential sorting.
Chapter 4 is concerned with the impact of a change in school quality on both components
of the housing market: selling price and liquidity. Its purpose is to account for a simultaneous
determination of price and time-on-market. First, the chapter presents a review of literature that
examines the determinants of housing market liquidity. Second, it lays out the theoretical
framework and search-theoretic model where prices and time-on-market are derived from the
maximizing behavior of both buyers and sellers. We then follow with the discussion of data and
the empirical methodology. We adopt a simultaneous equations model of sales price and timeon-market developed in Turnbull and Dombrow (2006) extending the hedonic price model used
in Chapter Three by controlling for neighborhood market conditions.
The final section of this dissertation, Chapter 5, offers concluding remarks based on
findings in the two previous chapters.
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Chapter 2: Background on Schools in East Baton Rouge Parish
The East Baton Rouge Parish School System (EBRSS) serves the Greater Baton Rouge
area. It is the third largest district in the state and among the top 75 nationally in student
enrollment. The EBRSS comprises 88 schools with an enrollment of approximately 45,000
students in pre-kindergarten through grade 12. The EBRSS has gone through many changes
because of its battle with school desegregation law suits. Table 1 represents EBRSS’s
desegregation timeline.
The constitutionality of Baton Rouge’s de jure segregated school system was first
challenged in 1956 in the case of Davis et al. v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board (78 F.3d
920, 926, 5th Cir. 1956). The first federal court order mandating school desegregation came in
1960, but it did not include any specific timetable. Baton Rouge schools continued to be
segregated on a de facto basis throughout the 1970s (Baird & Luster, 1990). In 1980, U.S.
District Judge John Parker found that the school system had not done enough to create a racially
integrated school system. As a result, in 1981, Judge Parker was presented with different plans
that tried a variety of strategies to ensure racial balancing. For example, the district submitted a
plan that called for the creation of more than 30 new magnet schools and centers of excellence to
attract white students to predominantly black schools and vice versa. The Justice Department
submitted a plan that focused on mixing the students in pairs and clusters of racially imbalanced
schools. 6 The NAACP endorsed the Justice Department plan even though it required longdistance busing.

6

Magnet programs are special interest programs for the high achieving student in grades K-12. They offer advanced
study, extended day services (elementary), expanded elective offerings, and educational choice.
Centers for excellence are highly-specialized programs operating within-a-school featuring a voluntary, openadmissions policy. Both are specialized programs to entice parents to voluntarily send their children to integrated
schools.
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Table 1. Desegregation Timeline
Year

The Desegregation Process in East Baton Rouge Parish

1956

Desegregation lawsuit filed on behalf of 37 African-American students

1981

Judge Parker institutes a desegregation plan that closes 13 schools and results
in widespread busing. The Elementary school’s part of the plan is
implemented, while the secondary school’s part of the plan follows next
year.

1995

Superintendent Gary Mathews proposes a desegregation plan calling for
community-sensitive attendance zones. The plan is debated but never goes to
a vote.
In late summer, the board, U.S. Justice Department and local NAACP agree
on a plan that eliminates mandatory cross-town busing in favor of
community sensitive attendance zones. Judge Parker orders it implemented
in the form of a consent decree in time for the opening of schools.

1996

1997
1998

Voters turn down a $2 billion tax plan to pay for new schools.
7

Voters approve a $280 million tax plan.

1999

Parker orders the school system to change attendance zones because of overenrollment in some schools.

2001

Judge Parker approves new attendance zones that results in the transfer of
more than 2,000 students. Also, in December, the residents of the cities of
Baker and Zachary reach an agreement with the EBRSS that allows Baker
and Zachary schools to separate from the parish wide system.

2003

The 47-year old desegregation case is settled.

7

In 2003, the voters renewed the collection of the sales tax for another five years.

10
Judge Parker found neither plan acceptable on its own and designed a new plan that
borrowed partly from the other two plans. 8

Judge Parker’s desegregation orders provoked

strong public resistance and an immediate withdrawal of many white students from the public
school system. The system lost about eight thousand students immediately following the court
order, making it even harder to desegregate the system. The drastic shift of the white students
from public to private schools that began at the time of mandatory busing was the best indicator
that the white flight was a result of the changes brought by an aggressive desegregation effort,
and not by a tendency toward suburbanization.9 For example, one of the city’s largest private
schools, Parkview Baptist, was founded in 1981, the first year of mandatory busing. Over 1600
students started the 2005-06 school year there. The white flight from Baton Rouge’s public
school system extends to teachers as well (Bankston & Caldas, 2002).
The Louisiana Department of Education data indicate that the percentage of the student
body that was African American jumped from 41 percent in 1980 to 44 percent in 1981. By
October of 2000, almost 70 percent of the students in the public school system were black.
Also, the percentage of white students in private schools went from 20 percent in 1980, to 25
percent in 1981, and by 1998 this percentage was at 48 percent.10 In addition, the percentage of
black students significantly increased over the next five-year time period, rising from 66 percent
in 1998 to 76 percent of total student enrollment; statewide, the black student enrollment

8

In this plan, students are randomly assigned among schools in a cluster. Paired schools draw all of their students
from the same attendance zone, and students attend one campus for certain grades and other campus for the
remaining grades.
9
EBR has reported that a recent slight increase in student enrollment might suggest that the outmigration of students
from the school system may be slowing. However, as reported by the U.S. Census Bureau, East Baton Rouge Parish
experienced a decline in population from 2000 to 2003. During the same time, Ascension Parish grew by 10.2
percent, Livingston Parish grew by 11.1 percent, and the state grew by 0.6 percent. EBR’s population decline not
only impacts the potential size of the public school student population, it may also weaken the tax base that supports
the school system.
10
Enrollment data cited throughout this section are from Louisiana Department of Education, Annual Financial
Report, various years.
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remained at 47 percent. The percentage of at-risk students increased by twenty percentage
points, from 51 percent in the 1998-99 school year to 72 percent in 2003-04; in contrast, the state
average only increased four percentage points, from 58 percent to 62 percent. These changes in
demographics are reflected in achievement scores. The Louisiana Department of Education
disaggregates testing data based on student subgroups such as race/ethnicity or poverty status.
The difference in performance or the achievement gap between black and white students in EBR
is 47.4 in 2003, with whites having an average performance score of 109 and blacks having an
average performance score of 61.6.11 East Baton Rouge Parish also has a considerable poverty
achievement gap—slightly over 40 points—which measures the difference in performance
between students who pay for their lunch and those who receive free or reduced price lunch. In
their analysis of school desegregation in Louisiana, Bankston and Caldas (2002) suggest that the
primary cause of the enormous shift of white students from public to nonpublic schools was a
direct result of the dismantling of neighborhood schools. By 1995, school system officials had
tried and failed to develop a “redesign plan” that would help desegregate schools as well as
improve the quality of education.
Finally, 15 years after court-ordered busing started, the board adopted a plan that
eliminated busing in favor of “community sensitive” attendance zones and introduced magnet
programs at inner-city majority black schools to attract white students. Several years later, the
board was forced to reassign students and change attendance zones in order to comply with the
attendance limits at the public schools set in a desegregation agreement reached in 1996.
Throughout this period, the EBRPSS experienced a significant erosion of public support
for their schools. As families leave the EBR school district, they take their political and financial

11

The performance score is out of 140.
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support, further eroding public confidence in the system. Even though the Consent Decree of
1996 calls for increased school spending, voters turn down a two billion tax plan to pay for new
schools in 1997. However, in 1998, a much smaller tax proposal of 280 million is approved.12
These events provide a rare opportunity to study the impact of changes in school
assignments and school quality as measured by test scores, and racial composition on housing
prices and time-on-market. The move to community sensitive attendance zones allows us to
include school quality as one of the measures of locational attributes. Also, the subsequent
changes in attendance zones or redistricting affect housing market in two ways. Many houses
are assigned to new schools, changing their locational attributes. In addition, the houses that
were not reassigned could be affected through peer effects to the extent that redistricting changed
the demographic compositions of the student bodies at their school.13 Even for those houses that
had stable school assignments, changes in attendance zone boundaries in other neighborhoods
led to large changes in the characteristics of the students assigned to their school.

12

This is the first tax plan in more than 25 years. In the article that appeared in The Advocate on October 11th voters
are urged to approve the tax bill which they call “a test of our willingness to grasp a better future for our community,
not just in the next 18 months, but in the next 18 years, and beyond.
13
Racial composition and socio-economic characteristics of student body are used to represent peer effects.
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Chapter 3: School Quality and Housing Prices
Capitalization Literature Review
The capitalization of local public services and property taxes into house values has been
at the center of local public finance literature for several decades. Capitalization literature and its
connection to community selection are often traced back to Tiebout’s (1956) argument that
households shop for communities by comparing the different fiscal packages in different
jurisdictions. The process of community selection drives differences in house values reflecting
local public service quality and property tax rates.
Property tax capitalization arises because a house value, just like the value of other assets,
is equal to the present value of the net benefits from owning it. Before reviewing the literature it
is useful to briefly explain what it is that studies try to measure.
Let R(S) be before tax rental value per unit of housing services. This value is a function
of local public service quality, S. Similarly, r the real discount rate, and T annual tax payment,
then the value of the house, V, is given by
V = (R(S)/r) - (T/r). 14
The equation is simply saying that the amount someone is willing to pay for a house is
the present value of the rental benefits minus the present value of the cost or property tax
payments. Since, by definition, tax payment is equal to the nominal tax rate, τ, multiplied by the
assessed value of the house, then the above equation can be rewritten as
V = (R(S)/r) - (τVa/r).
Also, since the effective tax rate, t, is equal to nominal tax rate multiplied by the ratio of assessed
to market value of a house the equation transforms into the following
14

Rather than talking about housing as a single commodity, urban economists have traditionally talked about
“housing services” which are all the attributes and the characteristics of the house and its location.
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V=(R(S)/r) - (tV/r)
Solving this equation for V yields
V = R(S)/(r + t).
The empirical literature on capitalization attempts to determine whether capitalization
exists and to estimate the degree of capitalization. The estimating equation is derived from the
asset value model and implies that the house value V is:
V= (R(S)/r) – β(tV/r)= R(S)/(r+βt),
Here β stands for the degree of capitalization, so that if β equals 0.5 then a $1 increase in the
present value of property taxes leads to a $0.50 decrease in the value of a house.
The objective of tax capitalization literature is to estimate β. Full capitalization is
considered to happen when, after controlling for all other housing and location characteristics,
differences in housing prices exactly equal the present value of variations in tax liabilities.
Partial capitalization (overcapitalization) is said to happen when differences in property values
are less than (greater than) the differences in the present value of tax liabilities. Fischel (2001)
argues that partial capitalization can usually be explained by two factors: an agent’s expectations
and inherent limitations in the data and econometric method. For example, partial capitalization
occurs when relevant differences among communities, such as school quality or other
environmental attributes, are known to buyers and sellers but not to researchers, or homebuyers
may not expect the current annual differences in taxes to last long.
Most of the early tax capitalization studies find varying degrees of tax capitalization.
Ross and Yinger (1999) provide an excellent survey of both the theoretical and empirical
capitalization studies.
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Tax capitalization is difficult to estimate for several reasons, even though the equation
that captures it is fairly simple. First, it cannot be estimated with linear regression methods
because it shows a non-linear relationship between t and V. To avoid this problem researchers
have used various approximations or non-linear estimating techniques. Second, the value of the
discount rate, r, is not observed and most studies typically assume a value for r.15 Third, the
asset-pricing logic behind capitalization equations requires assumptions about house buyers'
expectations. For example, this assumption predicts that a $1 increase in the present value of
future property taxes will lead to a $1 decline in house value, given β=1. But it does not say that
current tax differences will be fully capitalized if they are not expected to persist.
The studies that attempt to estimate the capitalization of publicly provided services face
the difficulty of measuring the quality of local public services. Existing data often do not
provide information on many dimensions of service quality. One approach to overcoming this
challenge is to use government spending per capita as a measure of public service quality (Oates,
1969, 1973)
However, several studies, including Ladd and Yinger (1994), Caroll and Yinger (1994),
Duncombe and Yinger (1996), argue that spending is a poor measure of service quality. They
show that equal per pupil expenditures among districts do not necessarily lead to equal
educational quality because environmental conditions, service factor prices, and service
production functions might differ among communities. For instance, environmental factors in
education include student body characteristics, such as the percentage of students with
disabilities, the percentage of students living in poverty, and the family background of students.
Researchers have shown that a district with a higher percentage of students with disabilities
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needs more per pupil expenditures to achieve the same level of educational quality, all else
equal. Also, a district could have higher per pupil expenditures as a result of higher input prices
in that district. Prices of capital, labor, and other inputs differ across geographical areas. All of
the above mentioned concerns about using education spending to capture school quality arise
because expenditures are an input into the education process rather than a measure of the output.
McDougall (1976) is the first to adopt an output measure of the local services. He uses
the sum of median test scores for twelfth grade students, the personal crime rate, the property
crime rate, a recreation index, and a fire insurance index as output measures of local services. 16
Even though his study shares some of the problems of macro data studies, it is a step forward in
the treatment of public service variables.17
Some of the more recent service capitalization studies use student test scores, crime rates,
or other similar data to measure local public services capitalization (Black, 1999; Bogart &
Cromwell, 1997, 2000; Brasington, 2002b; Haurin & Brasington, 1996; Hayes & Taylor, 1996;
Hilber & Mayer, 2001b; Weimer & Wolkoff, 2001).
Bogart and Cromwell (1997) focus on house prices in three neighborhoods in the
Cleveland metropolitan area, where children in each neighborhood attended public schools in
two different districts. In each neighborhood, all the houses were in the same municipality, and
home owners are assumed to have enjoyed the same level of public services provided by the
municipality. But each neighborhood was partly in one school district and partly in another, so
that educational services and school taxes differed among home owners in the same
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Some authors argue that the test scores do not necessarily represent what the school contributes to the student’s
academic achievement. They show that the test scores are influenced by school resources, family characteristics, and
peers. See Hanushek (1996) for various measures of school resources and their effect on student performance. For
evidence on specific family characteristics, see Hanushek (1992) and Baum (1986).
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Studies that use municipality or census tract as a unit of observation are considered macro data studies. The
dependant variable in these studies is usually Median House Value. These studies tend to have few control variables.
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neighborhood. Bogart and Cromwell do not have a direct measure of school quality, but in each
neighborhood, one school district clearly had a better reputation than the other. After accounting
for differences in the size and quality of the houses, the authors estimate the remaining difference
in the value of houses in what was considered the better school district in each neighborhood.18
The estimated differences are $5,600 in the first neighborhood, $10,900 in the second, and
$12,000 in the third. Since Bogart and Cromwell do not control for variation in school district
taxes, these differences in house values represent the combined effect of differences in school
quality and taxes. Even though Bogart and Cromwell do not have a direct measure of school
quality, the difference in house prices between school districts implies that a better reputation for
local schools translates into a measurable difference in house prices and outweighs the additional
taxes incurred.
Bogart and Cromwell’s (2000) house price study addresses redistricting effects. For the
data they consider, the redistricting occurred in order to improve racial integration in public
schools. They estimate a hedonic house price equation using a difference-in-difference
regression technique to determine the effects of losing a neighborhood school due to the change
in district boundaries for the Shaker Heights School District. Their findings reveal that
redistricting resulted in a decrease of $5,738 for an average priced house. In order to determine
if the unobservable neighborhood characteristics are driving their results, the authors also model
repeat-sales in this area. Repeat sales analysis provides another means for completely
controlling the location-based effects while not having to define neighborhood boundaries. This
technique is infrequently used in empirical models because limiting the data to repeat sales
diminishes the sample size significantly. After reducing their sample to houses that sold twice,
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to left-out variable bias.
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once before the change in boundaries and once after, Bogart and Cromwell are left with 634
home sales. They find that mean house prices still decrease, but by $7,593 compared to the
$5,738 found in the difference-in-differences technique. This finding indicates that the
unobservables from the difference-in-difference regression were not perfectly controlled.
Even with the most accurate measure of school quality, critics argue that a reliable
estimate of the value of a school cannot be differentiated from the location-based effects unless
these effects are precisely controlled. The difficulty with controlling for location-specific effects
stems from the fact that most are unobservable and others are difficult to quantify. Most of the
studies use census tracts to provide neighborhood demographics, and while there is a lot of
demographic information by tracts, they are relatively large geographic areas. It is safe to say
that defining a neighborhood by a census tract is more convenient than accurate.
Black (1999) argues that properly controlling for neighborhood influences is the key to
producing reliable estimates of any school effects; not adequately controlling for neighborhood
characteristics inflates the positive effects of a higher quality school because better public
schools tend to be located in better neighborhoods. When researchers look across different
school districts the estimated differences in house values represent the combined effect of
differences in school quality and taxes. Rather than compare houses in different communities as
her standard of comparison Black uses houses within the same community but in different school
attendance zones. Consequently, Black is able to construct a model that controls for
neighborhood effects while at the same time avoiding the problems associated with defining
neighborhood boundaries. Her data contains houses on different sides of elementary school
attendance boundary lines, but within the same district. Thus, homes presumably have the same
neighborhood effect, and the only difference between the homes is the elementary school that
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children attend. Black uses block group census data containing broad estimates of neighborhood
characteristics such as ethnic characteristics of the population, average parent’s education,
average age, and median household income to capture some of the variability in location. Block
groups are smaller geographic areas than census tracts, yet even with these controls, Black shows
that block groups alone as neighborhood controls are not enough to provide unbiased estimates
for the value of education.
Black finds the coefficient on the test scores decreases by half due to the inclusion of
neighborhood effects as captured by the boundary indicators. With no controls other than the
census characteristics, the average-priced house gains $9,212 for a 5 percent increase in test
scores, but when controlling for homes within 0.35 miles of the school attendance boundary, the
additional value for the increased test scores decreases to $4,324. Overall she finds that, all else
constant, parents are willing to pay about 2.1 percent more for a home where the quality of
education, as measured by standardized test scores, increases by 5 percent.
While the above mentioned studies examine either elementary outputs (Black, 1999;
Bogart & Cromwell, 1997) or middle school outputs (Haurin & Brasington, 1996), they do not
allow for separating the impact of school quality as measured by test scores and direct student
peer effects as measured by the socio-economic characteristics of the students in the school.19
Hayes and Taylor (1996) construct four possible indicators of school quality: current
expenditures per pupil, average sixth-grade achievement in mathematics on the Iowa Test of
Basic Skills, the marginal effect of the school on sixth-grade mathematics achievement, and the
expected achievement of the student body in sixth-grade mathematics. The first two of these

19

Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin (2002), and Hoxby (2000) examine the impact of racial and ethnic school
composition on performance. They find that the segregation by race has a strong adverse effect on school
performance.

20
indicators are common measures of school quality in the housing literature. The second two
indicators represent a decomposition of average mathematics achievement into school effects
and peer group effects. The marginal effect of the school measures the increase in student
achievement in mathematics that can be attributed to the school. The expected achievement of
the student body is also known as the peer group effect. In Hayes and Taylor (1996), the peer
group effect operates through test scores and is not included directly into the regression equation.
The peer group effect serves as a possible indicator of school quality because research has shown
that a high-achieving peer group in a school can have a positive effect on individual student
performance (Hanushek et al., 2002; Hoxby, 2000; Summers & Wolfe, 1977).
Peer group effects are measured by the socio-economic characteristics of students in a
school and have been examined in the earlier studies of school desegregation decisions. These
studies are designed to estimate the effect of changing racial composition of local schools
(Clotfelter, 1975; Evans & Rayburn, 1991; Gill, 1983; Jud, 1985; Jud & Watts, 1981; Vandell &
Zerbst, 1984). For example, Clotfelter (1975), using census tract data, looks at the changes in
house values during the period from 1960 to 1970. The variable of interest in this study is the
census tracts’ changes in the proportion of blacks in census tract high schools. The study finds
statistically significant and inverse relationships between house values and the proportion of
blacks in the tract.
More recently, Kane, Staiger, and Samms (2003) use data from North Carolina and find
that long-run measures of school test performance (school test scores averaged over many years)
are related to higher house prices, but they also point, to the fact that there is no evidence of
volatility in housing prices to match the annual volatility in test scores. They argue that the
annual volatility in the test scores makes it difficult for home buyers to distinguish the signal
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from the noise, and home buyers start to focus on characteristics that are unlikely to change
quickly, such as socioeconomic characteristics of schools. In addition, they evaluate the housing
market’s response to the categorical ranking of school performance, created by the school
accountability system, and find no effect from the North Carolina categorical rankings.
Several other more recent studies that examine both the academic quality and the racial
composition of local schools (Briggs, Clapp, & Ross, 2002; Clapp et al., 2005) find that test
scores have no effect on housing price in a model that controls for census tract fixed effects.
However, they find that racial, ethnic, and socio-economic composition all influence housing
prices.
Even though the public service capitalization literature is voluminous, there are only few
studies that take into account the effect of the housing stock adjustment (Brasington, 2002a; Edel
& Sclar, 1974; Hilber & Mayer, 2001a, 2002). Edel and Sclar (1974) use a sample of Boston
municipalities and look at the nominal tax rate for the time periods 1930, 1940, 1950, 1960 and
1970. They assume that expanding the data over several decades allows for supply adjustment.
They use school expenditure per student and highway maintenance per square mile as public
service variables. Edel and Sclar (1974)conclude that capitalization disappears in the long-run
because of the supply adjustment. While their study overlooks simultaneity, uses an
inappropriate tax variable, and has few control variables, it received some positive recognition
because it emphasizes the long-run supply adjustments.
Brasington compares capitalization rates at the edge and center of an urban area. His
house price hedonic estimation is based on 27,748 houses in 122 communities in Ohio. He
suggests that the rate of capitalization should depend on the elasticity of housing supply.
Because housing developer activity is stronger toward the edge of an urban area, there should be
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a weaker rate of capitalization of taxes and public services into house prices in communities at
the edge of an urban area. There should be a stronger rate of capitalization toward the interior of
an urban area where the housing supply is less elastic. His study tests for the capitalization of
taxes, crime, and school quality at the edge and interior of an urban area. He consistently finds
that school quality is positively capitalized into house values and crime is negatively capitalized
into house values. The study also finds that public services are always capitalized into house
values at a considerably stronger rate toward the interior of the urban area than toward the edge,
where developers are more active and the housing supply is more elastic.
In another study that links the extent of house price capitalization to local spending
decisions, Hilber and Mayer (2001a), argue that capitalization of fiscal variables and local
amenities is higher in urban areas where there is little available land relative to capitalization in
rural areas where land is more readily available. Their data set of Massachusetts communities
includes a measure of available land that varies among different communities. Their results
show that not only are fiscal variables and amenities capitalized to a greater extent in localities
with little available land, but also that these localities spend more on schools and their voters are
more likely to approve costly spending programs.
In a subsequent study, Hilber and Mayer (2002) argue that capitalization of school
spending into house prices can encourage residents to support spending on schools, even if the
residents have no school age children. The authors build on their earlier study by first extending
the analysis to include data from school districts in 49 states to show that per pupil spending is
positively related to population density, a proxy for the availability of land. They show that a
community with a density of 1,500 people per square kilometer spends $170 (3.3 percent) per
pupil more than a community with a density of 150 people per square kilometer. The results of
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this study also demonstrate that a positive relationship between density and spending is even
more significant in places with high home ownership rates. They then show that communities
with a higher percentage of residents above 65 years old have increased school spending only in
places with high population densities.

Theoretical Framework
The impact of the quality of public schools on housing values can be explained intuitively
through two components: bidding and sorting.20
Bidding analysis builds on a number of assumptions that approximately describe urban
areas in the United States. Each urban area is assumed to have many neighboring jurisdictions,
which have fixed land area and provide different bundles of local public goods and taxes. When
choosing a residential location, each household maximizes its utility given its income; its
preferences for consumption of public goods and private goods; taxes and the prices of private
goods.
This analysis first assumes that households fall into separate income/taste classes.
Households within a class are considered to be identical in their demands for these things, but
many classes may exist. Households are also assumed to be mobile and able to move costlessly
from one jurisdiction to another. This assumption implies that an equilibrium cannot exist unless
all people in a given income/taste class achieve the same level of utility. In other words, any
household that does not reach as high a utility level as similar households will have an incentive
to move, and this type of moving behavior will lead to a situation in which all similar households
have the same utility (and no household has an incentive to move). A residence in a jurisdiction
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is assumed to be a precondition for the receipt of public services there, and it is assumed that all
households that live in a jurisdiction receive the same level of public services. Finally,
households are homeowners, not renters, and local public services are financed through a local
property tax. In this model, households compete with each other for access to the most attractive
locations. These are assumed to be locations with the best combination of high-quality public
schools and a low property tax rate. Households compete for entry into desirable locations by
bidding against each other for housing.
In the simplest case, one can consider a single income/taste class. Because households
are mobile, as well as alike, each household must reach the same utility level. As a result,
households that live in jurisdictions with relatively attractive service-tax packages must pay for
the advantage in the form of higher housing prices. If the housing prices did not reflect the
attractiveness of local service-tax packages then these households would be better off than
households in other jurisdictions. In this case, the households in other jurisdictions would have
an incentive to move. The argument so far can be summarized in the form of a bid function,
which indicates the maximum amount a household would pay to live in a jurisdiction as a
function of the attractiveness of the service-tax package there.
Figure 1 describes the housing bids for one type of household, but, it does not tell how
different types of households are sorted into jurisdictions. The key to understanding sorting is to
recognize that bid functions like the one in Figure 1 are steeper for some types of households
than for others. The steepness of a bid function indicates the extent to which a household type's
bids for housing increase when the quality of public services increases. The steepness of a bid
function matters because landlords (or housing sellers) prefer to sell to the household type that is
willing to pay the most per unit of housing services. Thus, as shown in Figure 2, households
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with relatively steep bid functions win the competition for housing in locations where the quality
of public services is relatively high, and households with relatively flat bid functions win the
competition for housing in locations where the quality of public services is relatively low. For
example, the group with the steepest bid function in this figure wins the competition for all levels
of public service quality above S3. Under normal circumstances, high-income households have
steeper bid functions than low-income households. In other words, high-income households are
willing to pay more for an increment in public service quality. This relationship between income
and bid-function steepness implies that high-income households live in locations with relatively
high quality-public services. This situation is illustrated by Figure 2, in which the steeper bid
functions (the ones to the right) belong to higher-income classes and the flatter bid functions (the
ones to the left) belong to a lower-income class.
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Figure 1. Housing Bids as a Function of Public Service Quality (School Quality)
(Holding Property Tax Rate Constant)
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Figure 2. Bidding and Sorting
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The more formal model is shown in the following part. Hilber and Mayer (2001a) use
the same model in their study that links the extent of house price capitalization to local spending
decisions. The following discussion draws heavily from their study.
We start with a model that satisfies the standard location and land market equilibrium
conditions and then incorporate the land supply elasticity into the examination of school quality
capitalization:
1) No household can increase its utility by moving to another school zone;
2) The sum of the populations of the school zones must equal the entire population of the
metropolis and no community can have negative population;
3) The demand for housing in each school zone equals the supply of housing; and
4) No household can increase the utility by changing the consumption bundle.
For the simplicity, the model presented here considers a framework in which there are
two communities j=1,2 and N residents. Communities in our example are equivalent to
neighborhoods defined by school attendance boundaries. If, in equilibrium, households cannot
increase their utility by moving from one community to another, then there is an income level,
y*, such that
V ( e1 , p1 ( 1 + τ 1 ), y*) = V ( e2 , p 2 ( 1 + τ 2 ), y*) .

(1)

This condition is also called a boundary condition. Two more equilibrium conditions are related
to the land market or housing market

n j h j ( p j ( 1 + τ j )) = H ( p j )

(2)

n1 ( p1 ,τ 1 ) + n2 ( p 2 ,τ 2 ) = N .

(3)

and
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where e is the school quality or education services provided by local public schools; hj is the
demand for housing per resident; and H(pj ) is the housing supply function.21 These two
conditions require that the demand for land by households with y<y* equal the supply of land in
community 1 and the demand for land by households with y>y* equal the supply of land in
community 2.
To evaluate the impact of higher school quality in one community to prices in both
communities the above mentioned equations form a system that is differentiated with respect to

e1 as follows:
V ( e1 , p1 ( 1 + τ 1 ), y*) = V ( e2 , p 2 ( 1 + τ 2 ), y*) ,

(1)

using (2) and (3) we obtain
H 1 ( p1 )
H 2 ( p2 )
+
=N.
h1 ( p1 ( 1 + τ 1 )) h2 ( p 2 ( 1 + τ 2 ))

(4)

These two equations are the equilibrium conditions that determine p1 and p2. After some
manipulation we get
∂V1
⎡
⎢
∂p1
⎢
n
⎢ 1 (ε s −ε d )
1
⎢⎣ p1 1

Here ε 1s =

and ε 1d =

− ∂V2
∂p 2

⎤
⎥ ⎡ dp1 ⎤ ⎡ − ∂V1 ⎤
⎢
⎥
⎥⎢
⎥ = ⎢ ∂e1 ⎥[de1 ] .
n2 s
d ⎥ ⎣ dp 2 ⎦
(ε2 −ε2 )
⎣ 0 ⎦
⎥⎦
p2

(5)

∂H 1 p1
is the price elasticity of housing supply
∂p1 H 1

∂h1 p1
is the price elasticity of housing demand in community 1.
∂p1 h1

Similarly, ε2 denotes elasticity in the community 2.

21

The results are analogous to the case with an elastic supply of land. Housing supply is used here to simplify the
analysis.
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Solving (5) gives the following comparative static results:
− ∂V1 n 2 s
(
( ε 2 − ε 2d ))
dp1
∂e1 p 2
=
,
de1
D

(6)

− ∂V1 n1 s
( ( ε 1 − ε 1d ))
dp 2
∂e1 p1
.
=
de1
D

Here D =

(

(7)

∂V1 n 2 s
∂V n
ε 2 − ε 2d + 2 1 ε 1s − ε 1d <0
∂p 1 p 2
∂p 2 p1

(

)

(

)

)

We assume that ε s − ε d , population sizes and prices are positive so that that

and

dp1
>0
de1

dp2
< 0 . In another words, higher public school quality in the community 1 will drive house
de2

prices in that community to be higher than those in the community 2, all else equal.
To evaluate the impact of land supply elasticity on the extent of capitalization (6) and (7)
can be differentiated with the respect to ε1s using the quotient rule.

⎡ − ∂V1 n2 s
⎤ ∂V n
dp1
0D −⎢
(
( ε 2 − ε 2d ))⎥ 2 1
de1
⎦ ∂p 2 p1
⎣ ∂e1 p 2
=
2
∂ε 1
D

∂

(

)

If we assume that ε s − ε d , population sizes and prices are positive and given that the

dp1
de1
is always negative. In
∂ε 1

∂
denominator of (8) must always be positive, it follows that

another words, the extent of school quality capitalization in one community decreases with
increasing housing supply elasticity in that community.

(8)
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When comparative statics of the model equilibrium are simplified to include only two
communities, they provide some important insights. The higher public school quality in one
community will drive house prices in that community to be higher than in the other community,
all else equal. However, the extent of capitalization depends on the elasticity of the housing
supply; the capitalization of an increase in public school quality in community one decreases
with increasing housing supply elasticity in that community.
In short, the theoretical model predicts that if communities can freely expand their
housing stock in response to an increase in the public school quality, then a change in demand
for housing causes little or no change in house prices. In this environment, the change in school
quality is not capitalized into prices.

Data and Empirical Methodology
In the hedonic price model, the price of a house is a function of its physical
characteristics and neighborhood characteristics, such as public school attendance areas.
Housing is an example of a good that is unique and that has many quality dimensions. Houses
are modeled as single commodities that differ in the amount of various characteristics they
contain (building materials, number of bedrooms and bathrooms, etc.). Consumers derive utility
from the different characteristics of the commodity, and producers incur the costs that depend on
the varieties they provide. The interaction of consumers and producers in this type of market
determines the equilibrium hedonic price schedule.
In a model developed by Rosen (1974) in which certain products are a composite of
several characteristics represented by a vector x = (x1, x2,….,xn), the equilibrium price for any one
product is a function of the different characteristics of the product. This function is called an
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hedonic price function P = P(x). The hedonic price model allows us to isolate the effects of
individual characteristics on a composite good. Coefficient estimates of the hedonic model can
be translated as the implicit prices, or as consumers’ willingness to pay for different
characteristics of the composite good.
In the literature on school characteristics and house values, the primary challenges have
been to adequately measure the quality of the neighborhood and school and then empirically
separate those two effects. Selecting appropriate measures of neighborhood quality has proven
difficult, especially because the polycentric nature of the modern metropolitan area makes the
simple measures, such as distance to the central business district, inappropriate. Several
approaches have been used to address this issue.
Black (1999) uses the across-the-street estimation approach focusing on differences in
housing values near school boundaries. Presumably, houses studied with this approach have the
same neighborhood effect, and the only difference between the houses is the elementary school
that children attend. Similarly, Figlio and Lucas (2000) use a fixed effects specification that
captures any characteristics about properties in a given subdivision that change together over
time. These fixed effects are defined at the neighborhood calendar year level.

Empirical Specifications
The empirical hedonic price function can be defined as follows:

ln( Pinkt ) = α + δZ kt + Γ ink + ω t + ε inkt

(1)

where Pinkt is the price of house i in neighborhood n in school k at time t. Zkt are the year-specific
school level attributes, which includes school district performance as measured by standard test
scores and socioeconomic and demographic composition of the students.
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Γink is a term that captures non-school time-invariant observable attributes of the unit including
the neighborhood. εinkt is a time-variant unobservable that is assumed to be randomly distributed
and uncorrelated with Zkt and Γink, ωt’s are the time fixed effects like year, season, and month the
house sold . Equation (1) is the baseline hedonic model.
We define the time-invariant unit attributes as a function of observed housing unit
attributes (Xi) and neighborhood attributes (Wn).

Γ ink = βX i + µWn

(2)

Equation (2) requires the assumption that unobserved unit and neighborhood attributes are
uncorrelated with Xi as well as Wn. This specification uses neighborhood controls based on the
decennial census.
We also estimate our results by considering only those houses that are geographically
close to the school attendance boundary. We do this by rewriting equation (2) as

Γ ink = βX i + φK b ,

(3)

where Kb is the vector of boundary dummies that represent the unique boundary that house i is
associated with, the nearest boundary. The estimating equation now becomes:

ln( Pinkt ) = α + δZ kt + βX i + φK b + ω t + ε inkt .

(4)

Equation (4) is equivalent to calculating differences in house prices on opposite sides of
attendance boundaries while accounting for house characteristics and relating the differences in
prices to school quality information. In this approach, the boundary dummies allow us to
account for any unobserved neighborhood characteristics of houses on either side of an
attendance boundary.
In the next specification, we focus on the existence of nonlinear effects of school quality.
Chiodo, Hernandez-Murillo and Owyang (2005) argue that the linear specification of
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specification (4) presupposes that the marginal valuation of below-average schools is equal to the
valuation of above-average schools and results in a constant premium on school quality. They
reexamine this assumption and consider the possibility that the capitalization premium varies
over the range of school qualities. The nonlinearity in their model reflects two aspects of the
market for public education via housing. First, alternative schooling arrangements (e.g., private
school, home schooling, magnet schools, etc.) can provide home buyers with high quality
education even if they choose to live in below average school districts. Second, if house buyers
have positive valuations for education, they may concentrate their efforts among the highest
quality attendance zones, yielding increasing market tightness as school quality increases.
Buyers may face increased competition for the highest quality schools and a rapidly increasing
premium for houses in those attendance zones. Thus, linear valuations for education can induce
a nonlinear education premium. To allow for this possibility we rewrite (4) as

ln( Pinkt ) = α + f ( z kt ) + β X i + φK b + ω t + ε inkt

(5)

where f(zkt) represents a potentially nonlinear function of school quality. We call this
specification a nonlinear boundary fixed effects model.
Finally, we examine the theoretical prediction that the degree to which house prices
capitalize local amenities varies depending on the supply of land for new housing. To do this, we
split the sample into two groups, based on an indicator of land supply elasticity. Our most direct
measure of the land supply elasticity is the percentage of new residential construction in each
community, census tract. We expect the coefficients on the school quality characteristics in the
capitalization equation to be larger in the group of communities with little available land.
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An alternative approach to comparing houses with stable school assignments at a point in
time is to compare houses affected by redistricting over time. 22 Redistricting affected locational
amenities in two distinct ways. First, and most obviously, many houses were assigned to new
schools. In addition, even houses that were not reassigned may have been affected by
redistricting through peer effects if, by changing boundaries elsewhere, the redistricting
significantly altered the mix of students attending a school.
To analyze the effect of redistricting on housing vales, we use the full sample of housing
transactions from 1999 to 2002, including both houses with original school assignments and
houses that were reassigned. This specification is similar to using analysis of original school
assignments except that a new measure of school quality is used. This new measure is school’s
categorical ranking and is based on the school performance score, SPS.23 The SPS, a tool used in
the Louisiana School Accountability Program, is the primary measure of overall school
performance.
In summary, this chapter estimates four models to examine the original establishment of
the community sensitive attendance boundaries, the standard hedonic model, equations (1) and
(2); the attendance boundary fixed effects model, equations (1) and (3); the nonlinear standard
hedonic and boundary fixed effects models, equation (5); and one model that examines
redistricting: the standard hedonic model, equations (1) and (2). In addition, we also estimate the
same models for two different sub-samples that differ by their housing supply elasticities.

22

Since the district faced the court order to achieve a racial mix of students in the schools, the school assignment
areas crossed many existing neighborhood boundaries, which helps us separate the effects of school quality and
neighborhood amenities.
23
Starting in 1999, Louisiana Department of Education published school performance scores (SPS) for every public
school. The SPS is based on the attendance and test performance of all students.
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School and Housing Data
We restrict our analysis to detached single family houses and elementary school
attendance zones. Each unit of observation is described by variables reflecting its physical
characteristics, the quality of local elementary school to which children in the household are
assigned, and the characteristics of the neighborhood in which the house is located.
This study uses housing data that draws from the Multiple Listing Service (MLS) sales
reports for Baton Rouge, Louisiana for nine years from 1994 through 2002. Each house is
geocoded to a specific elementary school and census tract. The house characteristics include
common features such as Bedrooms, Bathrooms, Age, Living area, and Net area. Living area
and Net area are measured in thousands of square feet (Net area = Total area under the roof –
Living area). The house characteristics also include location, which is indicated by dummy
variables for MLS areas.24
Our analysis considers two different sources of variation to separate the effects of schools
and other neighborhood characteristics: differences in housing prices along attendance zone
boundaries and changes in housing prices following the change is school assignments. The first
approach uses data from 1994 through 1998. We use the percentage of students at the
proficiency level on standardized tests, the percentage of students qualifying for the free lunch
program, and the school racial composition to assess the quality of schools. We obtain school
quality data from the State of Louisiana Progress Profiles for the years 1994 through 2002.
These variables take on a value of zero prior to September 1996 since East Baton Rouge Parish
was under mandatory busing and students were not assigned to elementary schools based on their
residence location. The EBRPSS provided us with the maps of the school attendance areas as

24

The subject area covers contiguous region and excludes houses in Baker and Zachary.
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they were designed by the Consent Decree in 1996, as well as the new attendance zones
implemented after redistricting in 2001.
This study uses the census tract as proxy for neighborhood. The neighborhood
characteristics are defined based on 89 tracts in East Baton Rouge Parish during the 2000
Decennial Census. The data used include median household income, percent black in tract,
percent of owner occupied housing units, and percent of children of preschool and school age.
Finally, to capture market conditions, the specification includes year, season, and month
fixed effects based on the sales date in our housing data.

Figures 3 and 4 plot the locations of the elementary schools in 1996 and identify East
Baton Rouge Parish’s school attendance boundaries as described in the Consent Decree. Figures
3 and 4 also show the geographical area of census tracts. In addition, Figure 4 highlights the
boundary sample used in the boundary fixed effects specification.
Table 2 gives the summary statistics over 1994-1998 of the variables that enter into
regression analysis. The dependent variable, house sales price, is adjusted for inflation and the
mean of $124,812 is in year 1999 dollars. Variables under the heading House Attributes, include

num_beds, number of bedrooms (3.28), fullbath, number of full bathrooms (2.04), livarea, living
area in thousand square feet (1.912), and netarea, net area (.688). School Attributes are the
percent of students passing on standardized tests, test, (mean of 90.06 percent, standard deviation
of 6.30 percent); the percent of blacks, non-Hispanic, black_school, (mean of 50.50 percent,
standard deviation of 24.01 percent); and the percent of students qualifying for free lunch,

lunch_school, (mean of 47.90 percent, standard deviation of 21.10 percent). Even after years of
court ordered desegregation, the percent black in school ranges from 6.7 percent to 100 percent.
The range of free lunch students is similar to percent black students with minimum at 6.6 percent
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and maximum of 94.4 percent. This demonstrates substantial variations in school
characteristics.25
The variables used to describe neighborhood characteristics are under Tract Attributes
and include: medHH99, median household income in thousands of ’99 $ (mean of $50. 016);

blackP, percent black (mean of 22.52 percent); kidsP1, percent preschoolers (mean of 7 percent);
kidsP2, percent school age children (mean of 18.49 percent); and ownerP, percent of owner
occupied housing units (mean of 66.70 percent). In addition, the average percent enrolled in
private schools in the census tract, enrollP, is 5.2 percent with standard deviation of 8.3
percent.26

25

School averages are calculated using only houses sold after the publication of the Consent Decree document
containing school attendance zones. These cover sales made after June, 1996.
26
Private school enrollment data comes from National Center of Education Statistics’ (NCES) Common Core Data
(CCD).
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Figure 3. East Baton Rouge Parish: Elementary School Attendance Zones and Census Tracts.
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Figure 4. East Baton Rouge Parish: Boundary Sample.
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Table 2. Summary Statistics: 1994-199827
Variable (Description)

Dependent Variable
soldprR (sold price in '99$)

Number
of Obs.

Mean

Std.
Dev.

Min

Max

10640

124812.2

57246.1

40000

358146.5

School Attributes
test (percent passing CRCT)
black_school (percent black in school)
lunch_school (percent on free lunch)

7533
7533
7533

90.055
0.505
0.479

6.272
0.240
0.211

60.750
0.067
0.066

99.750
1.000
0.944

House Attributes
tom (time-on-market)
num_beds (number of bedrooms)
fullbath (number of fullbath)
livarea (living area in thousand sq. feet)
netarea (total area-living area)

10640
10640
10640
10640
10640

78.581
3.277
2.041
1.912
0.688

63.208
0.632
0.484
0.569
0.287

14.000
1.000
1.000
0.555
0.100

365.000
6.000
4.000
4.460
1.995

10640

0.667

0.188

0.051

0.909

10640
10640
10640
10640

0.225
0.070
0.185
50.016

0.238
0.018
0.042
15.323

0.010
0.018
0.032
11.397

0.984
0.126
0.326
78.509

10640

0.052

0.083

0.000

0.373

Tract Attributes
ownerP (percent of owner occupied
housing)
blackP (percent black in tract)
kidsP1 (percent kids under 5)
kidsP2 (percent kids 5-17)
medHH99 (median household income in
thousand '99$)
enrollP (percent enrolled in private
schools)

27

School averages are taken over the units sold after the Consent Decree was made public, so that they cover sales
made after June, 1996.
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Table 3 gives the summary statistics over 1999-2002 of the variables that enter into the
regression analysis following the school reassignments. The dependent variable, house sale
price, is adjusted for inflation, and the mean of $129,283 is in year 1999 dollars. Variables under
the heading House Attributes, include the number of bedrooms (3.23), number of full bathrooms
(2.02), living area in thousand square feet (1.898), and net area (.675). School Attributes include
the change in categorical ranking based on a change in the SPS; the change in percent of blacks,
non-Hispanic (mean of 5.14 percent, standard deviation of 8.20 percent); and the change in
percent of students qualifying for free lunch (mean of 6.03 percent, standard deviation of 6.70
percent). Starting in 1998-99 school year, Louisiana’s School and District Accountability
System reports a SPS for every public school. This score is calculated using index results from
three parts: the LEAP 21 tests, the Iowa Tests and the Attendance Index. School Performance
Labels are assigned based on this score. There are six performance categories: School of
Academic Excellence, 0 percent in the district; School of Academic Distinction, 1 percent in the
district; School of Academic Achievement, 5 percent in the district; Academically Above
Average, 33 percent in the district; Academically below average, 57 percent in the district; and
Academically Unacceptable, 4 percent in the district.28 For each school we construct a set of
dummies “SPS Improve” and “SPS Worse” that use the information about the school’s
performance category between two accountability cycles. For houses that are in the areas
affected by re-assignments we construct a set of dummies “SPS Improve” and “SPS Worse” that
use the information about the school’s performance category before and after the re-assignment.
In this case, “SPS Improve” equals one for a unit of observation if the school’s performance
category improves between two periods, under 1996 school assignment and 2001 school

28

All schools receive an annual growth target and are expected to reach a score of 120 by the 2013-14 school year.
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Table 3. Summary Statistics: 1999-2002
Variable (Description)

Dependent Variable
soldprR (sold price in '99$)
School Attributes
sps Improve (school improved
rating)
sps Worse (school lowered rating)
reassign (reassignment dummy)
blackChange (change in percent
black in school)
freelunchChange (change in
percent on free lunch)
House Attributes
tom (time-on-market)
num_beds (number of bedrooms)
fullbath (number of fullbath)
livarea (living area in thousand sq.
feet)
netarea (total area-living area)
Tract Attributes
blackP (percent black in tract)
kidsP1 (percent kids under 5)
kidsP2 (percent kids 5-17)
medHH99 (median household
income in thousand '99$)
enrollP (percent enrolled in private
schools)

Number
of Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

6414

129283.6

54784.23

40000

320000

6414

0.188

0.390

0.000

1.000

6414
6414
6414

0.061
0.126
0.051

0.240
0.332
0.082

0.000
0.000
-0.183

1.000
1.000
0.666

6414

0.060

0.067

-0.216

0.381

6414
6414
6414
6414

68.608
3.232
2.024
1.870

44.559
0.626
0.503
0.545

14.000
1.000
1.000
0.703

180.000
5.000
5.000
4.435

6414

0.675

0.282

0.110

1.995

6414
6414
6414
6414

0.208
0.069
0.184
50.331

0.231
0.018
0.042
14.774

0.010
0.018
0.032
11.397

0.984
0.126
0.326
78.509

6414

0.054

0.084

0.000

0.373
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assignment. In our sample, 18.6 percent sees an improvement in their school’s categorical
ranking, while only a little over 6 percent sees a decline in their school’s standing. This
improved ranking is due to reassignment in 10 percent of our sample. Over 70 percent of our
sample does not see any changes in their school’s categorical ranking even though 12.6 percent
of them are reassigned to different schools.
The variables used to describe neighborhood characteristics, Tract Attributes, are the
same as in the first regression analysis that considers the original school assignments.

Results
Results Based on Original School Assignments.29 Table 4 presents the results of the
parameter estimates. The first column shows a pooled cross-sectional analysis using baseline or
traditional hedonics with linear specification and neighborhood controls drawn form census tract
variables. The second column uses traditional hedonics with non-linear specification. Here, we
consider a possibility that the capitalization premium varies over the range of school qualities.
The nonlinearity in our model might be necessary to capture the alternative schooling
arrangements (e.g., private school, home schooling, magnet schools, etc.) that can provide home
buyers with high-quality education even if they choose to live in below-average school districts.
The last two columns present regression results using boundary fixed effects. For this analysis,
we determine the attendance boundaries for 60 elementary schools in East Baton Rouge Parish.
We follow Black (1999) and include in the sample only houses within a 0.35 mile buffer of the
attendance boundary. In this restricted sample there are 6,801 single family residences.

29

This section covers the time period 1994-1998.

45
Table 4. Regression Results Dependent Variable: ln(sold price in ‘99$)

Regressors
School Attributes
Test

(1)
BASELINE
HEDONIC

(2)
BASELINE
HEDONIC

Linear

Non-linear

-0.000246
(0.00069)

test sq
black_school

0.0362
(0.025)

black_school sq
lunch_school

-0.0629**
(0.030)

lunch_school sq

House Attributes
TOM
num_beds
Fullbath
Livarea
Netarea

-0.000253***
(0.000027)
0.00143
(0.0041)
0.0194***
(0.0051)
0.472***
(0.0065)
0.151***
(0.0080)

(3)
BOUNDARY
FIXED
EFFECTS
Linear

(4)
BOUNDARY
FIXED
EFFECTS
Non-linear

-0.00246
(0.0079)
0.0000103
(0.000046)
0.0269
(0.068)
-0.00825
(0.064)
0.182**
(0.080)
-0.239***
(0.080)

0.000766
(0.00085)

-0.00447
(0.011)
0.0000310
(0.000062)
-0.128
(0.13)
0.157
(0.11)
0.205
(0.14)
-0.233*
(0.13)

-0.000254***
(0.000027)
0.00198
(0.0041)
0.0184***
(0.0051)
0.471***
(0.0065)
0.150***
(0.0080)

-0.000231***
(0.000034)
0.0194***
(0.0053)
0.00648
(0.0061)
0.449***
(0.0083)
0.150***
(0.0098)

0.0650*
(0.039)

-0.0639
(0.050)

-0.000231***
(0.000034)
0.0195***
(0.0053)
0.00639
(0.0061)
0.449***
(0.0084)
0.149***
(0.0098)

Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: house age, mls area, year and season
sold.
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Our results in the Table 4 show that housing comparables enter the house pricing equation with
the expected sign. Increases in the living area, net area and the number of bathrooms increase
the price of a house, on average. The coefficient on the time-on-market (TOM) variable that
measures marketing time is consistently negative and significant at a 1 percent level across all of
the specifications. This implies that house sellers in Baton Rouge lower their reservation price as
the marketing duration increases.
In summary, the coefficients on the house attributes are very stable across different
specifications.
On the other hand, the estimated effects of school attributes are sensitive to the model
specification. The coefficient on the test scores is positive in the boundary fixed effects model,
column III in the Table 4 but is negative in baseline hedonic specification and both non-linear
specifications, columns I, II and IV respectively. Yet, it is statistically insignificant across all
four specifications. It could be argued that this coefficient understates the school-quality
capitalization, in part, because the district does not consistently publish the student achievement
data for its six within-school magnet programs, wherein magnet and traditional students attend
the same school but different classes. Approximately 8 percent of the district’s black population
and 12 percent of its non-black population are enrolled in the magnet program. A brief analysis
conducted by the district reveals that magnet students perform significantly better than the total
student population in schools offering within-school magnet programs. This line of argument is
supported by Hoyt (2003), which looks at the impact of open enrollment programs on property
values in the districts participating in the program. Since open enrollment program eliminates
the need to reside in a higher quality district to receive its educational services it reduces
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property values there while increasing them in the lower quality districts. Hoyt’s study finds
evidence that property values are lower in cities and townships where school districts have had a
net influx of students after the introduction of choice programs and higher where the net transfer
has been out of the district.30
Another possible explanation arises from the approach used in the analysis. The most
important feature of attendance boundaries that make them useful for this estimation is that they
are unchanging. The existence of this feature is what homeowners use when forming their
expectations about the local school. It is plausible that, since the attendance boundaries were
drawn in August of 1996, EBR homeowners do not have enough time to evaluate the information
about local schools and include that information in their pricing decisions. Similarly, according
to school district administrators, when attendance boundaries were first determined, the district
made every “reasonable good-faith effort” to desegregate the system while considering the size
of the school, the distribution of students by grade level, natural boundaries, and, in some cases,
family economics and neighborhoods. Anecdotal evidence points that the boundaries, once
drawn, were not meeting the requirements spelled in the Consent Decree and needed to be
redrawn.31 We use this implication of instability of the boundary sample and look at the school

30

The predicted impacts of the open enrollment programs on property values found using Hoyt’s model are
consistent with those found by Epple and Romano (1995) using a model that incorporates peer group effects and is
numerically solved. Also, Nechyba (1999; 2000) examines the impacts of vouchers for private schools programs and
Nechyba (2003) examines public school choice using a calibrated computable general equilibrium model of a
metropolitan area. His models generate reductions in property values in wealthy school districts when either a
private-school voucher or public school choice program is introduced.
31
For example, on September 27, 1996, shortly after the Decree was implemented, The Board sought permission to
exceed the proposed enrollment in 17 schools. Similar motions were filed on September 24, 1997 and October 23,
1998. It became apparent that the Board will have to redraw the boundaries in order to comply with Consent Decree
requirements.
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quality capitalization while excluding the boundary sample.32 Even after such an exercise, we do
not find any evidence of test score capitalization.
Additionally, our results indicate that the representation of blacks in local public schools
either leads to an increase in property values after controlling directly for the test scores or has
no effect. This finding is similar to Norris (2002), which examines the school quality
capitalization in six Louisiana parishes.33 Norris argues that when the enrollment of low-income
minorities in a school increases, the test scores suffer and the property values fall. But, for the
most part, families don’t tend to move away from schools simply because they have a growing
enrollment of minorities. We can conclude that property values are not significantly influenced
by racial integration, but they do respond negatively to increases in students qualifying for the
free lunch program. When looking at the baseline hedonic regression, specification (1), the
coefficient suggests that an increase of one standard deviation of students on free lunch is
associated with a 1.3 percent decrease in housing prices, or a decrease of approximately $1,623
at the mean (the mean house price is $124,812). This figure is very alarming since the
percentage of at-risk students in the school system increased by 20 percentage points, from
51percent in the 1998-99 school year to 72 percent in 2003-04. 34
Another interesting result in Table 4 is that the percent of school-age children enrolled in
private schools has a negative effect on property values, possibly indicating that some houses
must be sold at discounted prices to capture the cost of private education. This result is
consistent across all specifications and it shows that one standard deviation increase in the
enrollment in private schools is associated with about 0.7 percent decrease in housing prices.

32

These results are reported in the Appendix A.
Norris (1999) data covers six parishes with large shares of ethnic minorities, blacks in particular. He does not
include East Baton Rouge Parish is his analysis.
34
Students are classified as at-risk if they qualify for either free lunch or reduced-price lunch.
33
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When looking at boundary fixed effects regression, specification (3) and (4), the coefficient
suggests even larger impact of private schools enrollment, about 1.03 percent.
Table 5 shows the results of regression analysis where we consider the possibility that
land availability affects the extent of house value capitalization.35 In examining differential
capitalization, we divide the sample into two groups based on an indicator of land supply
elasticity. Our most direct measure is the percentage of new construction in each census tract.
Our first group includes observations in all census tracts where the new construction was less
than 25 percent of all houses offered for sale, and it is twice as big as the second group where the
new construction is greater or equal to 25 percent. Contrary to the theoretical discussion, school
variables are always capitalized into house values at a significantly stronger rate where housing
supply is more elastic. School variables are generally not related to housing prices in
communities where the new construction is less than 25 percent of all houses on the market.
On the other hand, school variables appear to be capitalized into house values in
communities where the new construction is more than 25 percent of all houses on the market.
We see the same pattern as in the earlier estimation: increasing the percent of blacks in schools
increases housing prices while increasing the percent on free lunch decreases the housing values.
It is also important to note that the coefficient in private school enrollment enters house price
equations with different signs. It is negative and statistically significant in the sample with less
elastic housing supply. On the other hand, it is positive, but with no statistical significance, in
the sample with more elastic housing supply.
In conclusion, our results indicate that house buyers are sensitive to differences in school
quality and school racial composition, but the amount they are willing to pay depends on a

35

Table 5 focuses only on school and neighborhood quality measures. All other regression results are presented in
the Appendix B.
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Table 5. Regression Results: Proxy for Land Supply Elasticity is New Construction in the Census

Tract: Dependent Variable: ln(sold price in ’99 $)

Regressors
School Attributes
test
black_school
lunch_school

Tract Attributes
enrollP

(1) NEW
HOUSING <.25
Baseline Linear
lnsoldprR

(2) NEW
HOUSING >.25
Baseline Linear
lnsoldprR

-0.00112
(0.00069)
-0.0208
(0.030)
-0.0541
(0.037)

0.000250
(0.0011)
0.249***
(0.040)
-0.125**
(0.051)

-0.133***
(0.030)

0.00532
(0.073)

Observations
7171
3469
R-squared
0.85
0.91
Robust standard errors in parenthesis
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: House Attributes, Tract Attributes,
house age, mls area, year and season sold.
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number of factors and the parameter estimates are sensitive to the specification of the model.
Another important set of results from this study relates to the subject of race and public schools.
The data illustrates that in the area of East Baton Rouge Parish with larger shares of ethnic
minorities, after controlling for the effect of test scores, the representation of blacks in public
schools either leads to an increase in property values or has no effect. In short, the housing
market is not directly discounting schools on the bases of race alone.

Results Based on Re-assignments.36 Table 6 reports estimates of the relationship between school
quality measures and house prices while focusing on school re-assignments. We present results
of pooled cross-sectional analysis using baseline or traditional hedonics with log-linear
specification and neighborhood controls drawn from census tract variables. Consistent with the
analysis based on the original school assignments, we again show that housing comparables enter
the house pricing equation with the expected sign. Increases in the living area, net area and the
number of bathrooms increase the price of a house, on average. The coefficient on the time-onmarket (TOM) variable that measures marketing time is consistently negative and significant at a
1 percent level across all of the specifications. For a second time, this would imply that house
sellers in Baton Rouge lower their reservation price as the duration of sale increases. Instead of
test scores, we use a set of binary variables (SPS Improve, SPS Worse) that is equal to one if the
house is in the school attendance zone that has a positive/negative change to its categorical
performance measure.37 Many schools in the EBRSS have long been low performing schools
and we have a reason to believe that buyers might be interested in trends in school quality. Using
these variables allows us to examine not just short-term fluctuations in test scores but also
longer-term progress. We also use another binary variable that captures the change in school

36
37

This section covers the period over 1999-2002.
We present our results using year specific level values in the Appendix C.
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Table 6. Regression Results Based on School Reassignments: Dependent Variable: ln(sold price

in ‘99$)

(1) Baseline hedonic

Regressors
School Attributes
sps Improve
sps Worse
blackChange

0.0516***
(0.0070)
-0.000666
(0.0093)
0.222***
(0.058)

0.00940
(0.0056)

0.0561***
(0.0075)
-0.00253
(0.011)
0.182***
(0.068)
-0.0585***
(0.022)
0.0135
(0.019)
0.0937
(0.11)
-0.0515
(0.10)
-0.167
(0.13)
0.0212**
(0.0099)

-0.000163***
(0.000045)
0.00236
(0.0050)
0.0274***
(0.0066)
0.426***
(0.0084)
0.135***
(0.0099)

-0.000164***
(0.000045)
0.00240
(0.0050)
0.0268***
(0.0066)
0.425***
(0.0084)
0.135***
(0.0099)

sps Improve * Reassign
sps Worse * Reassign
blackChange * Reassign
freelunchChange

-0.0948
(0.061)

freelunchChange * Reassign
Reassign
House Attributes
TOM
num_beds
Fullbath
Livarea
Netarea

(2) Baseline hedonic
With dummy variable
interactions
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Table 6 (continued).
(1) Baseline hedonic

Regressors
Tract Attributes
blackP
kidsP1
kidsP2
medHH99
enrollP

Constant

0.0136
(0.023)
0.275*
(0.17)
-0.406***
(0.11)
0.00398***
(0.00034)
-0.00994
(0.034)

(2) Baseline hedonic
With dummy variable
interactions

0.00625
(0.023)
0.239
(0.18)
-0.354***
(0.12)
0.00382***
(0.00035)
-0.0166
(0.035)

10.82***
10.83***
(0.025)
(0.025)
Observations
6414
6414
0.86
0.86
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: house age, mls area, year, season, and
month sold.

54
reassignments, so that it is equal to one if the house has been reassigned to a different school
after the 2001 change in attendance boundaries. Our results in Table 6 indicate that, holding
other factors fixed, an improvement in categorical ranking of school performance is associated
with a 5.61 percent increase in housing prices. On the other hand, we see no penalty for schools
that see a decline in their categorical ranking. We can conclude that house prices in these school
zones are based on comparables.
Table 6 also shows the regression result when we allow for interaction between dummy
variables for schools’ categorical ranking change and reassignment. The base group consists of
houses that are in the school attendance areas that have not changed their categorical ranking and
have not been reassigned. Even though the coefficient on reassignment indicator, reassign, is
positive, our results indicate that the estimated return of improved categorical ranking is
somewhat lessened if a house is re-assigned to a different school. The differential between those
houses that are reassigned to schools with higher categorical ranking than their previous schools,
relative to those who have not changed either school or its ranking, is about 2 percent. This
differential is equivalent to an increase of about $2,582 at the mean (the mean house price is
$129, 115). We conclude that the decrease in the premium for better schools indicates parents’
dislike of abrupt changes in their school environment.
Our results, once again, suggest that the representation of blacks in local public schools
leads to an increase in property values after controlling directly for the test scores. An increase
of one standard deviation in change of percent blacks in a school is associated with an increase
of 1.5 percent in the house price. At the same time, changes in student body eligible for free
lunch are not capitalized into house prices.

55
In addition, Table 7 shows the results of regression analysis when we consider the
possibility that land availability affects the extent of house value capitalization.38 Following the
earlier procedure, we divide the sample into two groups based on an indicator of land supply
elasticity, or the percentage of new construction in each census tract. As before, the first group
includes observations in all census tracts where the new construction was less than 25 percent of
all houses offered for sale, and it is more than twice as big as the second group where the new
construction is greater than 25 percent. The estimates reveal different capitalization rate for two
groups.
First, considering the neighborhoods with a less elastic supply of housing, column I of
Table 7, we report that the improved categorical ranking of a school is associated with a 7.8
percent increase in the house price. At the mean, this is equivalent to $9,227 (the mean house
price in this sub-sample is $118,300). We also see that there is a penalty equivalent to a 5.5
percent of house price associated with houses in the schools that saw a decrease in their
categorical ranking relative to those houses that saw no change in their school rankings. Within
these neighborhoods, for given levels of school and house characteristics, the difference in
log(price) between a house that changes school assignment and one that does not is 0.023. This
means that a house that is reassigned to a different elementary school is predicted to sell for
about 2.3 percent more, holding other factors fixed.
Consistent with our earlier findings, these results suggest that the representation of blacks
in local public schools leads to an increase in property values after controlling directly for the
test scores, while in this sub-sample a positive change in student body eligible for free lunch
lowers housing prices.

38

Once again, we focus on school quality variables; full regression results are presented in the Appendix.
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Table 7. Regression Results Based on School Reassignments: Proxy for Land Supply Elasticity is

New Construction in the Census Tract: Dependent Variable: ln(sold price in ’99 $)
(1)NEW
HOUSING<=.25

(2)NEW
HOUSING>.25

Regressors
School Attributes
sps Improve
sps Worse
blackChange
freelunchChange
reassign
Tract Attributes
enrollP

0.0779***
(0.011)
-0.0548***
(0.017)
0.474***
(0.088)
-0.193**
(0.077)
0.0226***
(0.0071)

0.0583***
(0.022)
0.0126
(0.012)
-0.488***
(0.25)
-0.337
(0.54)
0.144***
(0.053)

-0.0617
(0.038)

0.688***
(0.11)

Observations
4544
1870
R-squared
0.84
0.91
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: House Attributes, Tract Attributes,
house age, mls area, year, season, and month sold.

57
As predicted by the theoretical model, the neighborhoods with a more elastic supply of
housing show evidence of weaker rates of school quality capitalization. Column II of the Table
7 reports that the improved categorical ranking of a school is associated with a 5.8 percent
increase in the house price. However, this is equivalent to about $9,028 at the mean, only $200
less than in the sample with a less elastic housing supply. The mean house price in our sample of
more elastic housing supply is a $155,670.39 Figure 5 shows the location of houses in this
sample. We also find no penalty associated with houses in the schools that see a decrease in
their categorical ranking relative to those houses that see no change in their school rankings.
Within these neighborhoods, for given levels of school and house characteristics, the difference
in log(price) between a house that changes school assignment and one that does not is 0.144.
This means that a house that is reassigned to a different elementary school is predicted to sell for
about 14.4 percent more, holding other factors fixed.40 This finding seems conceivable since
EBR homeowners were aware that the EBRPSS will have to redraw the boundaries in order to
comply with Consent Decree enrollment requirements. The reassignments sent kids from
overcrowded schools to a different school in their neighborhood proximity.
Conflicting with the earlier findings, our results here suggest that the increase in percent
of black students in school leads to a decrease in property values after controlling directly for the
test scores, while in this sub-sample a positive change in student body eligible for free lunch is
negative but not statistically significant. It is also important to note that the coefficient on
private school enrollment enters house pricing equations with different signs. While it is
negative and very small in the sample with less elastic housing supply, this coefficient is positive

39

We plot this sample and show that it mostly consists of suburban homes.
EBRPSS administrators confirmed that following the attendance zones changes, some schools in the parish
outskirts saw a significant increase in student enrollment.

40
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in our suburban sample. It indicates that an increase of one standard deviation in the percent of
children in the census tract that attend private schools leads to a 3 percent increase in house
price. We suspect that this coefficient captures the additional value parents place on the
availability of private schooling options.

Sensitivity Tests
One of the challenges in the housing literature is separating the value of school test scores
from other neighborhood amenities. Researchers have to account for a complication that arises
because better schools tend to be located in better neighborhoods. As a result, not controlling
adequately for neighborhood characteristics may overestimate the value of better schools. Black
(1999) argues that any differences in unmeasured neighborhood characteristics would be
minimal if one considers properties very close to each other but on the opposite sides of
attendance zone boundaries. Others have argued that the similarity in neighborhood
characteristics that might exist when the boundaries are initially drawn may not last long as those
houses are bought and sold. They suggest that potentially unobserved differences in
neighborhoods near school attendance boundaries are relevant and still bias the estimates for the
effects of test performance on housing prices. This would imply that the areas being compared
are not really the same neighborhoods.
Black (1999) runs a number of sensitivity tests to investigate this concern including
creating artificial attendance boundaries. We do not worry about school attendance boundaries
being potential neighborhood partitions since, under a court-imposed desegregation plan in place
from 1981, the district imposed mandatory busing for its students, and it was not until 1996 that
the district adopted community sensitive attendance zones.
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We test the results’ sensitivity in a number of ways. First, we compare the results
obtained for data subsets for one-, two- and three-bedroom houses with the results for four- or
more bedroom houses. We assume that people who live in houses with more bedrooms are more
likely to have children, and are therefore willing to pay more for better schools than people in
houses with fewer bedrooms.
Table 8 reports the estimates from the model that examines school reassignments,
specification (1), along with the results we obtained when the sample is divided into sub-samples
based on a number of bedrooms. Focusing on the second and third column, we note different
rates of capitalization. Here, we examine changes in schools’ categorical ranking and observe
that there are some major differences between the two sub-samples. For example, negative
changes in schools’ categorical ranking, and percent free lunch are statistically significant in the
sub-sample of houses with three- and fewer bedrooms (column II). The coefficients on these
variables indicate that lowering school’s categorical ranking is associated with a 2.2 percent
decrease in house value, while increasing the change in percent free lunch is expected to lower
house values by 13 percent. Neither one of these two coefficients appear to be statistically
significant in the house price equation for our sub-sample of houses with more than threebedrooms. Other school variables enter both equations with the same signs but different
magnitudes; however, once interpreted at the mean, their impact is very similar.
Figure 5 plots the locations of houses divided in our sub-samples based on number of
bedrooms and percent of new construction for the estimation that considers original school
assignments. These sub-samples appear to be very comparable and divide the data into inner city
and suburban samples. Consequently, our results are similar to the results from regression
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analysis where we consider the possibility that land availability affects the extent of house value
capitalization.
Second, if the quality of the local public school affects the value of houses in that locality, then
homeowners will vote for better schools. We argue that homeowners’ concerns about the values
of their major asset make them more attentive to the benefits and costs of public education.
Fischel (2001) suggests that people who are motivated by house values are more likely to vote in
school related elections and have more knowledge of how schools are actually performing. If a
capitalization phenomenon is in part explained by homebuyers’ expectations and knowledge
about locational amenities, we propose that capitalization rates revealed by more informed
communities are better estimates of true capitalization. Thus, our findings in Table 9 reinforce
the idea that the capitalization results are due to the differences in elementary schools. We
collect voting returns from the school tax proposal in November 1998. Each house is geocoded
to a specific elementary school, voting precinct and census tract. Next, we divide the sample
based on precinct vote into: vote “yes” and, vote “no.” These results are presented in Table 9.
Similarly, Figure 5 plots the locations of houses in these two voting sub-samples. Our results
indicate stronger capitalization of improvement in the categorical ranking for those houses that
are located in precincts voting “yes” to the tax bill. For example, an improvement in a
categorical ranking is associated with about a $9,100 increase in the house price at the mean (the
mean house price is $130,129) as compared to about $5,300 increase at the mean for houses
located in precincts voting “no” (the mean house price is $106,659).
Finally, we consider a specification test to determine whether the nonlinear model in the
regression based on original school assignments is preferred to the linear model. Table 10 shows
the comparison. The explanatory power as computed by the adjusted R2 of each of the
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specifications is identical but according to the p-value, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the two specifications are different. This suggests that the quadratic terms are not important.
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Table 8. Regression Results when sample is divided based on a number of bedrooms:
Dependent Variable: ln(sold price in ’99 $)
(1)
Full sample
Regressors
School Attributes
Sps Improve
Sps Worse
blackChange

(2)
num_beds<=3

(3)
num_beds>3

0.0516***
(0.0070)
-0.000666
(0.0093)
0.222***
(0.058)

0.0557***
(0.0092)
-0.0222*
(0.012)
0.291***
(0.076)

0.0477***
(0.010)
0.0226
(0.014)
0.152*
(0.088)

-0.0948
(0.061)

-0.130*
(0.078)

-0.0233
(0.11)

0.00940
(0.0056)
10.82***
(0.025)
6414
0.86

0.00582
(0.0070)
10.65***
(0.036)
4432
0.81

0.000467
(0.0090)
11.45***
(0.097)
1982
0.86

Sps Improve * reassign
Sps Worse * reassign
blackChange * reassign
freelunchChange
freelunchChange * reassign
reassign
Constant
Observations
R-squared
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Table 8 (continued).
(4)
Full sample
Regressors
School Attributes
Sps Improve

(5)
num_beds<=3

(6)
num_beds>3

0.0561***
0.0563***
0.0521***
(0.0075)
(0.010)
(0.011)
Sps Worse
-0.00253
-0.0232*
0.0202
(0.011)
(0.014)
(0.016)
blackChange
0.182***
0.330***
-0.0245
(0.068)
(0.085)
(0.12)
Sps Improve * reassign
-0.0585***
-0.00245
-0.0369
(0.022)
(0.032)
(0.038)
Sps Worse * reassign
0.0135
0.0111
-0.00486
(0.019)
(0.027)
(0.037)
blackChange * reassign
0.0937
-0.0986
0.400**
(0.11)
(0.14)
(0.21)
freelunchChange
-0.0515
-0.211
0.396**
(0.10)
(0.12)
(0.20)
freelunchChange * reassign
-0.167
0.137
-0.674***
(0.13)
(0.18)
(0.21)
reassign
0.0212**
0.00192
0.0167
(0.0099)
(0.015)
(0.016)
Constant
10.83***
10.65***
11.45***
(0.025)
(0.036)
(0.097)
Observations
6414
4432
1982
R-squared
0.86
0.81
0.86
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: House Attributes, Tract Attributes,
house age, mls area, year and season sold.
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Figure 5. Sub-Samples
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Table 9. Regression Results when sample is divided based on a school vote:

Dependent Variable: ln(sold price in ’99 $)
(1)
Full sample
Regressors
School Attributes
Sps Improve
Sps Worse
blackChange

(2)
Vote Yes

(3)
Vote No

0.0516***
(0.0070)
-0.000666
(0.0093)
0.222***
(0.058)

0.0708***
(0.0086)
0.000667
(0.0096)
0.189***
(0.067)

0.0494*
(0.031)
-0.0467
(0.038)
0.408***
(0.12)

-0.0948
(0.061)

-0.0573
(0.068)

0.264*
(0.14)

0.00940
(0.0056)
10.82***
(0.025)
6414
0.86

-0.0104
(0.0063)
10.90***
(0.036)
4600
0.87

-0.00983
(0.015)
11.52***
(0.23)
1083
0.82

Sps Improve * reassign
Sps Worse * reassign
blackChange * reassign
freelunchChange
freelunchChange * reassign
reassign
Constant
Observations
R-squared
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Table 9 (continued).
(4)
Full sample
Regressors
School Attributes
Sps Improve

(5)
Vote Yes

(6)
Vote No

0.0561***
0.0813***
0.0168
(0.0075)
(0.0096)
(0.040)
Sps Worse
-0.00253
-0.0159
-0.00338
(0.011)
(0.011)
(0.059)
blackChange
0.182***
0.120
-0.192
(0.068)
(0.083)
(0.24)
Sps Improve * reassign
-0.0585***
-0.103***
-0.0820
(0.022)
(0.025)
(0.10)
Sps Worse * reassign
0.0135
0.0629**
0.00760
(0.019)
(0.019)
(0.12)
blackChange * reassign
0.0937
0.149
0.791***
(0.11)
(0.13)
(0.28)
freelunchChange
-0.0515
0.262**
1.162***
(0.10)
(0.12)
(0.41)
freelunchChange * reassign
-0.167
-0.551***
-1.376***
(0.13)
(0.15)
(0.47)
reassign
0.0212**
0.0182*
0.0632
(0.0099)
(0.011)
(0.043)
Constant
10.83***
10.91***
11.46***
(0.025)
(0.036)
(0.23)
Observations
6414
4600
1083
0.86
0.87
0.82
R-squared
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: House Attributes, Tract Attributes,
house age, mls area, year and season sold.
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Table 10. Specification Test on Boundary Fixed Effects.

MODEL

ADJUSTED R-SQUARED

Linear boundary fixed effects
Nonlinear boundary fixed effects

0.88
0.88

LR test = 4.08
Prob>χ2 = 0.2528

68

Conclusion
This study uses data from East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana from 1994 through 2002
to explain the relationship between property values and variables that include school
performance and school racial composition. The choice of East Baton Rouge Parish enables us
to deal effectively with a number of important issues in the housing literature.
First, public schools are only one of the public services attached to any particular
location. Since we consider a single school district and political jurisdiction, we can adequately
control for the provision of public services other than elementary education.41 Second, the factors
that determine neighborhood quality are hard to identify and compute. In order to control for
neighborhood effects, we follow the approach introduced first by Black (1999), where we restrict
our sample to houses in close proximity to elementary schools’ attendance boundaries.
Additionally, several events make East Baton Rouge Parish an ideal place to study the
effect of school test scores and school racial composition on house prices. First, under a courtimposed desegregation plan in place from 1981 through 1996, the district imposed random
school assignments for its students.42 In an effort to achieve racial balance, formerly white and
formerly black schools were paired or clustered, and students were bused to their clusters based
on the need to create racial balance. These kinds of desegregation orders created strong public
resistance and a migration of white students from the public school system. Finally, 15 years
after court-ordered random assignments started, the district adopted a plan that eliminated busing
in favor of “community sensitive” attendance zones, which were drawn to maximize a sense of
community ownership of the schools.43 The move to community sensitive attendance zones

41

We focus on elementary schools because only these schools allow for enough within district variation.
The school district is governed by East Baton Rouge Parish School Board.
43
Consent Decree, page 2.
42
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allows us to include school quality as one of the measures of locational amenities.
Our findings, based on the initial school assignments, show that the housing market does
not seem to be sensitive to increases in test scores. We attribute this to many changes that East
Baton Rouge Parish School System has been through because of its battle with school
desegregation law suits. As suggested by Kane et al.(2003), a school that is improving has a
difficult time signaling that improvement to the buyers in the housing market. Similarly, the
availability of choice programs and instability of school attendance boundaries would also
contribute to underestimation of school quality capitalization. 44 However, when considering
race, the statistical result is encouraging. We find that the housing market is not directly
discounting schools based on race. There is an indication that the representation of blacks in
local public schools either leads to an increase in property values or has no effect, after
controlling directly for the test scores. On the other hand, the housing market shows that prices
do respond negatively to increases in students qualifying for the free lunch program.
Our findings based on reassignments show that housing prices respond to improvements
in the categorical ranking of school performance but do not penalize for schools whose
categorical rankings decline. The results indicate that the estimated return of improved
categorical ranking is somewhat lessened if a house is reassigned to a different school. Earlier
work by Figlio and Lucas (2000) about Florida finds some evidence that public disclosure of
school report cards has an impact on house values. 45 We show that the improvement in
categorical ranking has large impact on housing prices. Yet again, we find that the housing
market is not directly discounting schools based on race.

44
45

The district runs a number of choice programs such as magnet program, and majority-to-minority transfers.
Florida schools were assigned grades A-F based on test performance.
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When considering the impact of housing supply elasticity on capitalization we split the
sample into two parts based on the percentage of new construction, a proxy for available
developable land. The coefficients on school variables are less stable and contrary to the
theoretical predictions in the house price equation that considers the initial establishment of
school attendance boundaries. School variables are generally not related to house prices in
communities where the new construction is less than 25 percent of all houses on the market. On
the other hand, school variables appear to be capitalized into house values in communities where
the new construction is more than 25 percent of all houses on the market. We argue that since
our sample with lower housing supply elasticity represents inner-city housing, these schools have
been low performing schools for some time and were known as such to house buyers. We do see
that house prices in this sample account for private school enrollments and discount house
values.
When education policymakers are pondering investments in education they must
consider the costs involved as well as the benefits. The results of this research provide valuable
information for evaluating the economic benefits of a current political issue such as school
testing and accountability. The housing market reveals that the type of grading system used or
the indicators of quality can have a large effect on property values. For example, our study
indicates that in considering a neighborhood with a less elastic supply of housing, concentrated
mostly in a central city, the improved categorical ranking of a school is associated with a 7.8
percent increase in the house price. At the mean, this is equivalent to $9,227 (the mean house
price in this sub-sample is $118,300). Similarly, there is a penalty equivalent to a 5.5 percent of
house price associated with houses in the schools that saw a decrease in their categorical ranking
relative to those houses that saw no change in their school rankings. This result implies that
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central city house values are more elastic with respect to improvements in elementary school
categorical rankings. Thus, improving elementary schools has a great potential for increasing
house values, and, as a consequence, revenue from property taxes.
Our unique data provides a rare opportunity to study how a sudden exogenous change in
public policy impacts the housing market. The changes in school assignment implemented by
East Baton Rouge Parish School System are a natural experiment in education policy. Because
the school district was operating under a court-imposed desegregation order, we can observe the
effects of these exogenous changes on housing market locational amenities. Such exogenous
change allows us to use classical statistical theory that works only if variations in data occur
randomly. Furthermore, the empirical findings of the effect of land availability on the extent of
school quality capitalization have strong implications for future theoretical and empirical studies
in the housing literature.
A house is typically a person's largest asset. The quality of local public schools is often a
major consideration when a family with school-age children looks for a house to buy, and a
child’s placement in public elementary school is based on a family’s residential location. Thus, a
family with school-age children makes two investment decisions when it chooses a residential
location: the first is the investment in housing, and the second is the investment in the human
capital of their child. Most families are risk-averse agents who are, at once, investing in housing
and education, both long-term and illiquid portfolio investments. Even though numerous studies
look at house buyers’ valuations of school quality, there is little attention given to its effect on
liquidity. In the next chapter we turn our focus to the impact of school performance and school
racial composition on liquidity. By taking into account the interrelationship between prices and
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time-on-market, this dissertation offers a more complete estimate of the impact of changes in
school characteristics on the housing market than previous research offers.
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Chapter 4: School Quality and Housing Market Liquidity

Time-on-Market Literature Review
Housing is a heterogeneous good that is spatially distinct. Buyers and sellers must
expend resources to find potential matches and complete a transaction. Thus, in addition to
pricing, the time component of the search process, or liquidity, is also relevant. Liquidity is
usually defined as an asset characteristic that reflects how quickly the asset can be sold at a given
price. In essence, the price-setting problem is an exercise in how to balance the desire to sell at a
high price with the reality that high priced houses are likely to stay on the market for a long time.
Thus, a common measure of liquidity is the time-to-sale under optimal pricing, or time-onmarket (TOM).
The literature concerning the contribution of house characteristics or locational attributes
to marketing time can be broken down into the theoretical and empirical studies. The observation
that exchange in the housing market takes place only after agents conduct a search suggests that
it is possible to borrow models developed in other areas of economics, such as labor economics,
to study asset pricing. 46 However, in this summary, we focus our attention only on the
empirical studies of TOM and its determinants. The body of work on this issue is less extensive
and more recent than the price capitalization literature. This is in part due to the lack of
agreement over the proper methodology to be employed in estimating TOM.
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Lippman and McCall(1986) are among the first to adapt such models to real estate asset pricing. Haurin (1988)
adopts a very similar model. One shortcoming of both models is that the analysis is conducted in a partial
equilibrium framework. The authors take the behavior of house buyers as given and model only the behavior of a
house seller. Arnott (1989) introduces the buyer’s problem into the model, but he simply assumes that they take the
house with the lowest price. Wheaton (1990) is one of the first authors that jointly model the buying and selling
decision. Even though Wheaton (1990) incorporates both buyers and sellers into his model, one shortcoming is that
the analysis is conducted exclusively in the steady state. Williams (1995)extends Wheaton’s model to a dynamic
setting.
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Cubin (1974 ) examines the relationship between price and TOM for home sales in
Coventry, England, between June 1968 and June 1970. He initially develops a “quality
adjusted” price, which represents the difference between the actual sales price and expected sales
price generated by a hedonic-type estimation based on specific home characteristics. Cubin
assumes a geometric distribution for TOM.
He hypothesizes that houses with positive quality adjusted prices will take longer to sell.
The study uses the log of TOM as a dependent variable and uses the least square technique to
regress it on the quality adjusted price and house characteristics. Contrary to his hypothesis, the
results show that a house with a higher quality adjusted prices sells faster. Cubin argues that this
result is possible since a buyer might use price as a signal of home quality. For example, the
buyer assumes there is superior quality and lower repair expenses in a higher priced home. Also,
Cubin raises the possibility that a least squares regression model is not capturing the simultaneity
between price and TOM.
Belkin et al.(1976) introduce the effects of submarkets on TOM. In this study, buyers are
limited to a specific geographic area and price level, resulting in separate supply and demand
characteristics for each submarket. The authors use a price level submarket of about 1000
transactions in the Hartford, Connecticut, area in 1970 and 1973. In order to maintain an
identical information level for all transactions they limit the study to MLS sold homes. They
specify TOM as an exponential process.
The main argument of this study is that TOM measures value and submarket
performance. In essence, similar houses with the same price in the same submarket should have
the same TOM. They also argue that the probability of selling a house is not influenced by
TOM. The main findings reveal that price concessions made by an owner increase over time,
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making the home more attractive to buyers. Another interesting finding of this study is that
housing features do not influence TOM within a particular submarket.
Trippi (1977) argues that price and TOM should be positively related since the
probability of selling a property is inversely related to the price of the property. He also
contends that TOM follows an exponential process. This study uses residential income property
units sold in San Diego County between April 1973 and October 1974. Trippi uses canonical
analysis and argues that this method avoids a simultaneity problem between price and TOM. He
chooses the log of TOM and the log of the ratio of income to price as dependent variables. The
empirical results support his hypothesis and show that price and TOM are positively related.
Miller (1978) uses a multiple regression model to examine the relationship between TOM
and price for 91 residential units sold in Columbus, Ohio, in the latter half of 1976. His model
uses selling price as the dependent variable. His argument, which says that a seller with lower
search or opportunity costs can wait for a higher offer, also, calls for a positive relationship
between TOM and price. The study’s empirical results support his argument. Miller also argues
that since both variables, selling time and price, are influenced by the characteristics of the
property (size, location, quality of public services), the simultaneous influence makes the study
of the relationship between time-on-market and selling price difficult. He states that unless a
market can be located where the equilibrium or average time-on-market is stable and equal
across all price ranges, locations, and sizes within the sample, traditional statistical approaches
and empirical tests are questionable.
Zuehlke (1987) examines the sale probability of a home, given its elapsed TOM. The
analysis is based on a sample of 290 single-family properties in Tallahassee, Florida, in February
1982. Zuelhke employs a Weibull hazard model to show that an owner becomes more risk
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averse over time and lowers his reservation price. He also finds that this is more evident for
vacant homes.
Haurin (1988) tests the impact of price dispersion on TOM for 219 sales in a
neighborhood in Columbus, Ohio, between April 1976 and April 1977. The central argument of
this study is that atypical units, the units that have odd features or characteristics when compared
to other homes in the area, are subject to a greater dispersion of offering prices, resulting in a
longer TOM. The argument arises from the assumption that the seller is aware that buyers value
atypical characteristics differently, thus, the seller expects a wider distribution of offers. Haurin
argues that the seller believes it is worthwhile to wait longer in hope of receiving a higher offer.
The author uses survival regression to analyze TOM and finds that atypical houses take longer to
sell. His findings also reveal that TOM falls when a house is listed with a large broker.
Kang and Gardner (1989) employ OLS estimation techniques to explore how property
marketing time is influenced by the complex relationship between selling price, listing price,
property characteristics, and market conditions. Using data from the Mclean County, Indiana,
the authors find a positive relationship between new loan rates and marketing time, shorter
marketing time for newly constructed properties, and the lack of a size effect on property
marketing time.
Ferreira and Sirmans (1989)examine two different market regimes to determine whether
home sellers concede assumption financing premiums to buyers in order to reduce TOM. Their
data covers 51 assumption-financed home sales and 66 conventionally financed home sales in
1975 and 1976, and 68 assumption-financed home sales and 62 conventionally financed home
sales in 1980 in Greenville, South Carolina. They model TOM using two-stage least squares. In
the first stage, they model the log of time as a function of the ratio of list price to selling price
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and average conventional mortgage rate. The second stage, then, includes a hedonic price
model, where the log of price is regressed against home characteristics, TOM, and the cash
equivalent of the financing premium. Their findings are mixed. For the first time period, they
report that sellers did not negotiate away the financing premium to reduce TOM. However, in
1980, the financing premium is conceded to buyers to achieve a faster sale. The authors attribute
the difference in the seller strategy to the depressed market conditions in 1980.
Even though the tradeoff between selling price and TOM is well recognized, most of the
existing literature examines the impact of housing attributes on either selling price or TOM.
Several recent studies estimate a property’s selling price and TOM jointly (Huang & Palmquist,
2001; Knight, 2002; Sirmans, Turnbull, & Benjamin, 1991; Turnbull & Dombrow, 2005). To
capture the possibility that selling price and TOM are interactive variables, some studies estimate
simultaneous or two-stage models. Various aspects of the market environment, including both
economic market factors and property characteristics, affect the liquidity of the housing market
as well as selling prices. For example, age of the structure sometimes acts as a proxy for housing
condition; as a house ages, it deteriorates physically. Additionally, a house’s design might be
outdated, and the demand for such a house is likely to be reduced. It is anticipated that the
marketing time for older houses would be longer. Similarly, higher selling prices are anticipated
for Spring and Summer sales. Furthermore, it is shown that seasonality affects the marketing
time in the residential real estate market (Haurin, 1988; Kluger & Miller, 1990). For instance,
families with children are less motivated to either buy or sell houses when school is in session.
Consequently, technical problems arise because the specifications of both the price and TOM
models are similar. The following is a brief summary of such studies.
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Forgey, Rutherford, and Springer (1996)focus on the impact of search effort and liquidity
when they estimate a two-stage least squares model of house prices and TOM. They use data
from 3358 single-family house sales in Arlington, Texas, between May 1991 and June 1993. In
the first stage, the dependent variable is the log of TOM. Consistent with earlier TOM studies,
their results of the first stage show that TOM depends on the seller’s search effort, market
conditions, physical characteristics of the property, the size of the brokerage firm, and listing
price. They then use the predicted values and residuals from stage one to create the expected
time-on-market variable and the relative difference of the actual selling time and expected timeon-market. In the second stage, the dependent variable is the log of the selling price. The
findings of the second stage indicate that increases in expected TOM result in higher sales prices.
This result supports the notion that a sales price will increase as a seller more throughly searches
the market for the highest offer. The findings of the second stage also indicate that deviations
from the expected time-on-market are inversly related to selling prices. This result supports the
notion that buyers will pay a premium for properties that are more liquid relative to other
properties.
Another study that implements OLS models for selling price and TOM is Haag,
Rutherford and Thomson (2000). The hedonic price model of this study makes the typical
assumption that the log of the sales price of a house is a function of housing characteristics,
location, seasonality controls, TOM, and the real estate agents' comments.47 The TOM equation
is very similar. The log of the marketing time of a house is a function of housing characteristics,

47

Many studies examine a role of real estate agents or brokerage on the sales price (Benjamin, Jud, & Sirmans,
2000; Yavas & Yang, 1995). The provision of a multiple listing service (MLS) allows agents to search for
properties that will fit the client’s needs. This listing contains information regarding age, size, number of bedrooms,
number of bathrooms, and other physical characteristics. For each listing on MLS, a section is provided for agents
to furnish additional information about the property. Examples of these remarks include “Well maintained home,”
“Ready to sell,” and “New paint.”

79
location, seasonality controls, listing price, and the real estate agents' comments. They find that
TOM has a significant negative effect on selling price, but the list price is shown to be not
significant in the TOM equation. According to their results, motivated sellers accept lower
selling prices. Updated properties produce a higher selling price and a shorter selling time.
However, the authors find that some other improvements such as new paint and roof work
decrease price and increase TOM.
Huang and Palmquist (2001) investigate the total impact of an enviromental disamenity,
in this case highway noise, on property values and TOM. They first estimate the reservation
price by using the hedonic reservation price model and assuming that the reservation price is
determined by characteristics of a house and a random component that captures the price
variation not explained by housing characteristics. They then describe the TOM model using
survival analysis. The empirical analysis of the Kingsgate, Washington, housing market shows
that highway noise has no significant impact on TOM, but it has a significant negative impact on
reservation and sale prices.
In examining the effect of exclusive agency and exclusive-right-to-sale contracts,
Rutherford, Springer and Yavas (2001) estimate a two-equation simultaneous equations model
for selling price and TOM. The first stage regresses TOM against various factors, and the second
stage regresses selling price against a similar set of factors. The only difference between the two
equations is that the seasonality controls are constructed based on the list date in the TOM
equation and sales date in the price equation. The results show a positive relationship between
selling price and selling time and that exclusive agency listings and builder-owned listings have a
shorter selling time than exclusive-right-to-sale listings and owner-held properties. Their
findings support the theorethical model that shows the seller being better off with an exclusive
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agency contract than an exclusive-right-to-sell contract because the former results in greater
broker effort which, in turn, leads to faster sale. However, exclusive agency listings are
associated with lower selling prices while builder-owned properties have higher selling prices.
A 2001 study by Johnson, Salter, Zumpano and Anderson examines the effect of artificial
stucco on house prices and selling time. 48 They use a game theoretic framework to model the
interaction between buyers and sellers. They first run a probit model to relate the presence of
artificial siding to explanatory variables. Next, they estimate the selling price using atypical
explanatory variables with artificial stucco included. Finally, they use duration modeling to
measure the effect of artificial stucco on selling time. Their results suggest that properties with
artificial stucco sell at a premium although the selling time is longer.
Knight (2002) considers the causes and effects of changes in list price on the selling price
and TOM connection. Following Yavas and Yang (1995) and Forgey et al. (1996), Knight
employs a two-stage least squares model to control for possible simultaneity bias in the selling
price and TOM models. In general, the model regresses the log of selling price on TOM,
marketing choices of the seller, physical characteristics of the house, location, and time of sale.
Marketing choices of the seller are the size of commission offered by the seller and the size of
the listing firm used by the seller. Similarly, their model of TOM includes signals of seller
motivation, aspects of the home that affect its marketability or increase the seller’s search costs,
and a time trend to control for market conditions. Specifically, the factors signaling seller
motivation include the list price markup over expected selling price, owner financing, size of
commission offered by the seller, and the size of the listing firm. Knight proposes that by using
heterogeneity as a composite representation of the principal attributes, the study is able to
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Artificial stucco is formally known as Exterior Insulation and Finish Systems.
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employ the individual house’s physical characteristics to identify the time-on-market equation
and permit two-stage least squares estimation.
In the first stage, he estimates predicted values of the two endogenous variables, selling
price and TOM, and in the second stage he makes a substitution of these predicted values as
explanatory variables in each of the individual structural equations. The study finds that the two
most important determinants of price revision are the total length of time the home is marketed
and the amount by which the home is overpriced initially. He also reports that homes with large
percentage adjustments in listing price not only had longer selling times but also ultimately sold
at lower average selling prices.
Anglin, Rutherford and Springer (2003) use a two-stage process to estimate the impact of
the list price on the trade-off between selling price and TOM. In the first step of their analysis,
they estimate the expected list price based on house characteristics and market conditions. They
then use this information to create the degree of overpricing, the percentage difference between
the actual listing price and the expected listing price.49 Their theoretical model shows that there
is no direct tradeoff between selling price and selling time but that market conditions affect how
the expected selling price and the expected selling time vary jointly based on the initial listing
price. They estimate a TOM model using a hazard model with a Weibull distribution. Their
study finds that increases in the list price increase TOM.
Most recently, Turnbull and Dombrow (2006) examine how spatial competition and
shopping externalities affect house selling prices and TOM. They base their empirical model on
the simultaneous equations model, and improve on previous studies that use the hedonic price
approach by controlling for localized demand and supply conditions. The different elements in
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Other papers that focus on the degree of overpricing include Glower, Hendershott and Haurin (1998), Anglin and
Wieber (2004).
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the neighborhood supply and demand conditions vectors ensure that both regression equations
are identified in the 2SLS estimation, thus, solving price-TOM equations identification problems.
In addition, using a measure for spatial competition removes source of spatial correlation in
housing data.50 Their study finds that housing prices and TOM reflect both competitive and
shopping externality effects from neighboring houses.
In summary, the literature on asset liquidity yields important insights into the sources of
liquidity. It is possible that the market illiquidity arises because of the fact that real estate buyers
are heterogeneous. Some buyers attach higher valuations to a given house than others.
Therefore, a seller has an incentive to wait for the buyers with the highest valuations. For
example, buyers who care about education may concentrate their efforts in the highest quality
school attendance zones, creating an increasing tight housing market as school quality increases.
These buyers might also face increased competition for the highest quality schools and rapidly
increasing premiums or lower illiquidity for houses in those attendance zones.
In the next section we investigate the relation of locational amenities and liquidity. In
particular, we study how changes in school performance and school racial composition impact
simultaneously determined house price and marketing time. By taking into account the
interrelationship between prices and time-on-market, this dissertation provides a more complete
estimate of the impact of changes in school characteristics on the housing market than previous
research offers.
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Such measure is appropriate because, among other reasons, when a house is put on the market, the list price is
often set with the knowledge of selling price of similar houses in the neighborhood.
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Theoretical Framework
The search theory originates in labor economics (Kiefer & Neumann, 1979; Lippman &
McCall, 1986; Mortensen, 1970), and it has wide applications for understanding the natural
unemployment rate, unemployment insurance, and government policies such as the minimum
wage. The standard search theory can also be applied to describe house sellers. Indeed, the
problem facing a consumer looking for the lowest price or an unemployed agent looking for the
best paying job is structurally the same as the problem faced by a homeowner looking for a
buyer.
On the theoretical side, Arnott (1989) establishes a one-sided search model to examine a
seller’s search behavior and the vacancy rate. Arnott’s results show that vacancies are socially
useful because they give households more choices. Wheaton (1990) uses a two-sided search
model to match up sellers and buyers to study the equilibrium vacancy rate in the housing
market.
The housing market is such that there is no central marketplace where investors can trade.
Buyers must search for sellers. Search is costly because agents are not able to instantly complete
the trades. For example, a potential buyer cannot value a house without actually walking
through it. Two agents can walk through the same house, yet attach very different subjective
values to it. Buyers and sellers meet and determine whether there is an incentive to trade. If
there is no incentive, the agents wait for another pairing. The process of identifying houses on
the market and then visiting them can be expensive both in terms of money and time. This
heterogeneity of preferences plays an important role in determining how liquid the market is.
The model used here is a search-theoretic model, developed in Krainer and LeRoy
(2002), where prices and TOM are derived from the maximizing behavior of both buyers and
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sellers. The main purpose of the model is to generate state-dependant liquidity. In this case, the
state variable describes the quality of local public schools and takes on just two values, low and
high. State-varying liquidity implies that prices do not absorb all of the gains (losses) in asset
values when the environment switches from state to state. The model offers two important
observations. First, the probability of sale in the high state is greater than it is in the low state;
expected TOM is shorter in the high state. Second, prices are higher in the high state.
The model and its properties are fully developed in Krainer and Leroy (2002). The
discussion below draws heavily from their study.
The main assumption in such a model is that agents form expectations about the kinds of
transactions that are realistic in the economy and then meet prospective trading partners
consecutively. The main purpose of the model is to describe agents’ decision rules in this
setting. For example, a seller must decide how much to charge for a house. In fact, a seller
forms expectations about how much buyers are willing to pay for a house, and the seller must
decide when to accept an offer and when to reject it. The trade-off for a seller, then, is to weigh
the benefits of further searching against the costs of delaying the sale. The benefits of further
search are based on the possibility that a buyer may arrive who attaches greater value to the
house. On the other hand, the costs of sale delay include the agent’s delay of consumption and
uncertainty that arises from the fact that once the agent rejects an offer it is unclear when the next
satisfactory offer will arrive. Similarly, a buyer can compute the value of owning a house by
capitalizing the expected housing services the house provides and comparing this value to the
selling price, taking into consideration the opportunity to continue to search for another house.
It is assumed that agents who live in houses have a “match” with their houses and
consume housing services. In the real world it is uncommon for people to live in the same house
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for an entire lifetime. Agents can lose a “match” with their houses. The arrival of children may
cause a family to leave a small house in favor of a bigger one. A homeowner may sell a house
because he takes a new job in another city. When an agent loses his match, he moves out
immediately and puts the old house up for sale. An agent who leaves the house must specify a
pricing rule for the old house and a search strategy that is utility maximizing. To make the
problem more realistic, we assume that not all agents have the same preferences for houses that
they visit. Differences in their preferences mean that the search process may take time.
More formally, assume there are a large number of agents in an economy and they
consume two goods: housing services and a background good. They are risk neutral in both
goods. Also assume that the consumption of the background good at any date equals the
negative of their net expenditures on housing at that date. There is a fixed number of houses in
the economy and no depreciation of the existing housing stock.
An agent who owns and lives in a house enjoys a per period housing service flow, λ.
This service flow is constant for as long as an agent lives in the house. It is assumed that agents
leave their houses because agents lose their “match” with their houses. We capture the notion of
mobility by assuming that the “match” of an agent with a house persists each period with
probability π. When an agent leaves a house and searches for a new one, she draws a new λ
from the uniform distribution F on the interval [0,1].51 Draws from this distribution by potential
buyers are independent.
Once an agent loses the “match”, the house does not provide a service flow to its owner,
and the owner puts it on the market. As a seller, an agent views the house merely as an asset and
attempts to sell the house for as much as possible. Each period, a potential buyer visits the
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empty house and determines how much she likes the house. She either pays the asking price
posted by the seller or chooses not to buy, in which case, she does not consume any housing
services in that period and searches again in the next. The steady state equilibrium in this
economy consists of utility maximizing decision rules for both buyers and sellers.
The price setting decision is made before the seller has any knowledge of the dividend
that the house will provide to the visitor. Thus, the seller cannot be sure how much the visitor is
willing to pay for the house. This combination of asymmetric information and asset
heterogeneity is the source of illiquidity in the market.
The seller sets a price on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. If the visitor chooses to buy, the seller
collects the sales price immediately. If the visitor chooses not to buy the house, the house stays
empty for this period and the seller tries to sell the house in the next period.
Additionally, let q be the expected value of having a house on the market and let
µ(p) be the probability that a house will sell when the list price is p. The seller chooses a
price to solve

q = max p {µ ( p ) p + ( 1 − µ ( p ))βq}

(1)

The first part states that with probability µ the seller receives the asking price for the house. The
second part relates to the possibility of re-listing the house in the next period. The seller puts the
house back on the market and tries to sell it again in the next period. Here, the parameter β is a
discount factor.
The first order condition that gives the optimal price p is

dµ
( p − βq ) + µ( p ) = 0
dp

(2)

The selling price of housing, p, and the expected value of having a house on the market,

q, are determined in equations (1)–(2) in terms of µ, the probability of sale function.
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We now consider the optimal behavior for the agent in his role as buyer. We start first
with an agent who currently has a “match” and will consume the housing service flow λ at the
beginning of the next period. After this period, the homeowner will continue to consume λ if the
match persists for another period, an event that happens with probability π. If, on the other hand,
the match fails, the agent must put the house on the market and begin to search again, an event
that happens with probability 1 – π. Define v(λ) to be the lifetime expected utility of owning a
house yielding service flow λ, then

ν ( λ ) = β ( λ + πν ( λ ) + ( 1 − π )( q + s ))

(3)

The first and the second part of the equation state that an agent will consume housing
service flow with certainty for the first period and with the probability of π for the second period.
The third part relates to the house selling process, which we saw above, yields q in expected
value. The agent also has an option to search for a new house at this point. The value of this
search option is represented by s.
Under the optimal buy rule the agent buys the house with service flow λ for price p only
if the expected value of the house net of price is greater than the option to search again next
period. That is,

ν ( λ ) − p ≥ βs .

(4)

Since v is strictly increasing in λ and βs is constant, there exists a λ* such that a searching agent
is indifferent between buying a house for the asking price p and searching again next period.
That is, there exists an λ* such that

ν ( λ*) − p = βs .

(5)

A buyer keeps searching if she draws λ< λ* and buys if she draws λ>λ*. Therefore, we can
write the expected value of search as
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⎛1
⎞
s = F ( λ*)βs + ( 1 − F ( λ*))⎜ ∫ν ( λ )dF ( λ ) − p ) ⎟
⎠
⎝ π*

(6)

Here, the probability of sale is simply the probability of drawing λ>λ*. Given that F is the
uniform distribution on [0,1] so that µ = 1 – F(λ*), or

µ = 1− λ*

(7)

The equilibrium is a symmetric Nash equilibrium: An equilibrium in which each agent’s
decision rules are best responses to the same decision rules when adopted by other agents. The
equilibrium is a price of housing p, an expectation of the value of a house on the market q, an
expectation of the outcome from the search process s, a reservation service flow λ*, and a belief
about the probability that a buyer will purchase a house µ when the price is p. 52 All these
variables must satisfy equations (1), (2), (5), (6), and (7). These equations can be solved
numerically.
In this model, optimal pricing implies that a house sells with probability less than one
each time period. The expected TOM is

TOM =

1− µ

µ

.

(8)

To evaluate what happens when the houses in the market have different amenity levels
such as school quality attached to them, we redefine the housing service flow to consist of an
idiosyncratic component λ and an aggregate component x,
d =λ + x.

(9)

The idiosyncratic component λ has the same interpretation as before. The state variable x is
aggregate in that all agents who live in houses receive exactly the same x. The variable x can
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The proof for the existence of equilibrium can be found in Krainer and LeRoy (2002).
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reflect the aggregate state of the economy such as employment growth and interest rates. Under
this interpretation, shocks to the productivity of the land or to job growth filter their way into
house prices through x. A more concrete interpretation of x could include amenity levels such as
school quality or the level of crime in the area. Under this interpretation, changes to a locationspecific component in the housing service that reflects the value of land filters into house price
through x. By adding a random variable x to the housing service flow, the equations above that
define equilibrium become functions of x. The main result of this model is the joint derivation of
a probability of sale function µ(x) and a pricing function p(x). The main proposition of the
model is that the probability of sale, µ(p), differs across states of x. Krainer (1999) shows that
the probability of sale is higher in the “high” state than it is in the “low” state.53 A second
observation is that housing prices are also higher in the “high” state.
Thus, we expect that houses located in higher quality school attendance areas show
capitalization of school quality both in terms of prices and liquidity, where better schools lead to
shorter selling times as well as higher house values. 54

Empirical Methodology
Many empirical studies have used log-linear regression models to estimate
determinates of TOM (Belkin et al., 1976; Miller, 1978; Sirmans et al., 1991). To
capture the possibility that selling price and TOM are interactive variables, some studies
have estimated simultaneous or two-stage models. The complexity in this process arises

53

Krainer (1999) proves this proposition by assuming that the probability of sale is constant over x, and then derives
a contradiction. This proof is presented in the Appendix D.
54
For simplicity, assume that x is a random variable that can take on just two values, low and high. In terms of
school quality, high state can be viewed as school that receives an improved categorical ranking based on a student
performance score.
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because the specifications of both price and the TOM model are very similar, making it
hard to identify separate equations.
In a typical empirical study of housing market liquidity, the listing or selling
prices along with the physical and location attributes of the house are on the right-hand
side, and TOM is on the left hand side. The methodology of this study is a simultaneous
system of a hedonic price model and a TOM model. We use an approach developed in
Turnbull and Dombrow (2006). This approach allows us to extend the hedonic price
model used in Chapter III by controlling for localized neighborhood market conditions,
thereby eliminating the need to deal with the consequences of spatial correlation. In our
models, the log of sales price is explained by the marketing time, house characteristics,
school characteristics, location, and housing market condition. TOM is a function of the
sales price, house characteristics, school characteristics, location, and housing market
condition. The different variables used to describe local housing market conditions
ensure that both regression equations are identified in the 2SLS estimation.
We modify the hedonic price function from the previous chapter to capture the
simultaneity in price time relationship as follows:

ln( Pinkt ) = α + β 1TOM + δZ kt + Γ ink + ω t + Φ ijk + ε inkt
′
TOM = α + β 2 ln( Pinkt ) + δZ kt + Γ ink + ω t + Φ ijk + ε inkt

(1)

where Pinkt is the price of house i in neighborhood n in school k at time t. Zkt are the year-specific
school level attributes, which include school district performance as measured by standard test
scores and the socioeconomic and demographic composition of the students. Γink is a term that
captures non-school time-invariant observable attributes of the unit including the neighborhood.
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Φ ijk and Φ ijk ′ are terms that capture neighborhood housing market conditions. εinkt is a timevariant unobservable that is assumed to be randomly distributed and uncorrelated with Zkt and

Γink. ωt’s are the time fixed effects such as year, month and season that capture market
conditions.
We define the time-invariant unit attributes as a function of observed housing unit
attributes (Xi) and neighborhood attributes (Wn).

Γ ink = βX i + µWn

(2)

Equation (2) assumes that unobserved unit and neighborhood attributes are uncorrelated with Xi
as well as Wn. This specification uses neighborhood controls based on the decennial census. The
estimating system of equations now becomes

ln( Pinkt ) = α + β 1TOM + δZ kt + β X i + µWn + ω t + Φ ijk + ε inkt
′
TOM = α + β 2 ln( Pinkt ) + δZ kt + β X i + µWn + ω t + Φ ijk + ε inkt

(3)

We also re-estimate our results by considering only those houses that are geographically
close to the school attendance boundary. We do this by rewriting equation (2) as

Γ ink = βX i + φK b ,

(4)

where Kb is the vector of boundary dummies that represent the unique boundary that house i is
associated with, the nearest school attendance boundary. After incorporating this adjustment, the
estimating system of equations becomes:

ln( Pinkt ) = α + β 1TOM + δZ kt + β X i + φK b + ω t + Φ ijk + ε inkt
′
TOM = α + β 2 ln( Pinkt ) + δZ kt + β X i + φK b + ω t + Φ ijk + ε inkt

(5)

The system of equations in (3) and (5) can be estimated using various methods including
the instrumental variable approach (e.g., two- and three-stage least squares). The different
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′
elements in the neighborhood housing market conditions, vectors Φ ijk and Φ ijk , ensure that both
regression equations are identified in the 2SLS estimation. The 2SLS estimates we report take
into account the endogeneity of price and marketing time. Turnbull and Dombrow (2006)
present how spatial competition and externality effects can be applied to the housing market and
therefore controls for the local housing market conditions are required in estimating price and
TOM equations. The basic idea is that the number of houses for sale in a small neighborhood
surrounding a particular house can have localized effects on the distribution of prospective
buyers and sellers. A greater number of houses for sale increases the competition among sellers
for buyers considering houses in the neighborhood. Similarly, a greater number of houses for
sale may draw more prospective buyers to the neighborhood, potentially increasing the chance of
matching a particular house with a buyer.55
Therefore, the sales price is explained in part by the concentration of competing listings
in the neighborhood, listing density, LD, which is captured in vector Φ ijk . The TOM equation

′
uses a modified measure of localized competition, C, which is captured in vector Φ ijk .
These measures for each house i are as follows:

LD = ∑

(1 − D( i , j ))2 O( i , j )
s( i ) − l( i ) + 1

C = ∑ (1 − D( i , j )) O( i , j )
2

(4)

(5)

Here, l(i) and s(i) are the listing date and sales date for house i, respectively, so that TOM is now,

s(i)-l(i)+1. Correspondingly, l(j) and s(j) are the listing date and sales date for house j. O(i,j)
represents the overlapping TOM for contemporaneously listed houses i and j, and is defined as

55

For detailed discussion of spatial competition and shopping externalities in the housing market and the
construction of the variables to capture those, see Turnbull and Dombrow (2006).
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O( i , j ) = min[s( i ), s( j )] − max[l( i ),l( j )] + 1. D(i,j) is the distance in miles between houses i and

j and it is calculated using the geocoded data.
The calculations for these variables include all applicable competing house sales; that is,
houses j within one mile of the house i. These calculations are constructed to account for the
number of days that competing houses actually overlap, weighted by the distance between them.
The distance weighting is necessary to capture the belief that competing houses that are close by
have stronger effects than houses that are farther away. The calculations also include houses
listed before and after our sample period that overlap with our sample period. Following
Turnbull and Dombrow (2006), a competing house is defined as one that is 20 percent larger or
smaller in living area than the house for sale.
In summary, we use the 2SLS to re-estimate the hedonic price models from Chapter III
that examine the original establishment of the community sensitive attendance boundaries: the
standard hedonic, system of equations (3); the attendance boundary fixed effects, system of
equations (5); and one model that examines redistricting: the standard hedonic, system of
equations (3). To analyze the effect of redistricting on housing values, we use the full sample of
housing transactions from 1999 to 2002. This specification is similar to using the system of
equations (2) except that a new measure of school quality is added: change in school’s
categorical ranking that is based on the school performance score. Our simultaneous model of
sales price and marketing time specifically controls for the effects of competition among nearby
houses for sale.
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Data
In addition to variables described in Chapter III, we create six new variables that describe
the neighborhood housing market.56 These are: listing density that measures the average intensity
of competition (LD); competition measures the cumulative competition from other houses over
the entire marketing time for a given house (competition); new listing density/new competition
is similar to the listing density/competition but only includes newly listed houses in its
calculation (newLD/newCompetition); vacant listing density/vacant competition is similar to the
listing density/competition but only includes competing vacant houses in its calculation (vacLD/

vacCompetition). 57
Table 11 and Table 12 give the summary statistics over two time periods, 1994-1998 and
1999-2002, of the variables that enter into the regression analysis. The variables used to describe
neighborhood housing market are under Neighborhood Market Conditions. These are indexes
that measure concentration and competition of other listings in the neighborhood.

56

Turnbull and Dombrow (2006) suggest that these variables capture the effects of neighborhood market conditions
because the number of houses for sale in a small neighborhood surrounding a particular house can have localized
effects on potential buyers and sellers. A greater number of houses increases the competition among sellers for
buyers who are searching in a particular neighborhood. Similarly, a greater number of houses for sale in a particular
neighborhood may draw more potential buyers increasing the likelihood of a match between a house and a buyer.
57
Newly listed house is defined to be any house that has been listed for 14 days or less.

95
Table 11. Summary Statistics: 1994-1998
Variable (Description)

Number
of Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Dependent Variable
soldprR (sold price in '99$)
TOM (time-on-market)
School Attributes
test (percent passing CRCT)
black_school (percent black in
school)
lunch_school sq (percent on free
lunch square)
House Attributes
num_beds (number of bedrooms)
fullbath (number of fullbath)
livarea (living area in thousand sq.
feet)
netarea (total area-living area)
Tract Attributes
ownerP (percent of owner occupied
housing)
blackP (percent black in tract)
kidsP1 (percent kids under 5)
kidsP2 (percent kids 5-17)
medHH99 (median household
income in thousand '99$)
enrollP (percent enrolled in private
schools)

10640
10640

124812.2
78.58111

57246.1
63.20812

40000
14

358146.5
365

7533
7533

90.055
0.505

6.272
0.240

60.750
0.067

99.750
1.000

7533

0.479

0.211

0.066

0.944

10640
10640
10640

3.277
2.041
1.912

0.632
0.484
0.569

1.000
1.000
0.555

6.000
4.000
4.460

10640

0.688

0.287

0.100

1.995

10640

0.667

0.188

0.051

0.909

10640
10640
10640
10640

0.225
0.070
0.185
50.016

0.238
0.018
0.042
15.323

0.010
0.018
0.032
11.397

0.984
0.126
0.326
78.509

10640

0.052

0.083

0

0.373
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Table 11(continued).
Variable (Description)

Neighborhood Market Conditions
LD (Listing Density)
newLD (New Listing Density)
vacLD (Vacant Listing Density)
competition (Competition)
newCompetition (New Competition)
vacCompetition (Vacant
Competition)
a

Number
of Obs.

10640
10640
10640
10640
10640
10640

Mean

3.654
1.866
0.565
291.855
180.019
47.6146

Std. Dev.

2.666
1.610
1.145
364.480
280.892
131.4766

Min

Max

0
0
0
0
0
0

18.797
14.193
10.481
5206.805
4868.132
2364.172

School averages are calculated using only houses sold after the publication of the Consent
Decree document containing school attendance zones. These cover sales made after June, 1996.
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Table 12. Summary Statistics: 1999-2002
Variable (Description)

Number
of Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

6414
6414

129283.6
68.608

54784.23
44.559

40000
14.000

320000
180

6414

0.188

0.390

0

1.000

6414
6414
6414

0.061
0.126
0.051

0.240
0.332
0.082

0
0
-0.183

1.000
1.000
0.666

6414

0.060

0.067

-0.216

0.381

6414
6414
6414

3.232
2.024
1.870

0.626
0.503
0.545

1.000
1.000
0.703

5.000
5.000
4.435

6414

0.675

0.282

0.110

1.995

6414
6414
6414
6414

0.208
0.069
0.184
50.331

0.231
0.018
0.042
14.774

0.010
0.018
0.032
11.397

0.984
0.126
0.326
78.509

6414

0.054

0.084

0

0.373

6414
6414
6414
6414
6414
6414

3.798
1.739
1.875
263.677
141.995
133.419

2.494
1.446
1.724
277.029
187.771
182.757

0
0
0
0
0
0

18.302
11.306
13.600
2727.606
1724.786
1985.733

Dependent Variable
soldprR (sold price in '99$)
tom (time-on-market)
School Attributes
sps Improve (school improved
rating)
sps Worse (school lowered rating)
reassign (reassignment dummy)
blackChange (change in percent
black in school)
freelunchChange (change in percent
on free lunch)
House Attributes
num_beds (number of bedrooms)
fullbath (number of fullbath)
livarea (living area in thousand sq.
feet)
netarea (total area-living area)
Tract Attributes
blackP (percent black in tract)
kidsP1 (percent kids under 5)
kidsP2 (percent kids 5-17)
medHH99 (median household
income in thousand '99$)
enrollP (percent enrolled in private
schools)
Neighborhood Market Conditions
LD (Listing Density)
newLD (New Listing Density)
vacLD (Vacant Listing Density)
competition (Competition)
newCompetition (New Competition)
vacCompetition (Vacant
Competition)
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Results
This section reviews some of the key results from different sample areas and is based on
the previously described empirical models. Our findings based on original school assignments
are reported in Table 13, while Table 14 reports our findings based on school reassignments.
These results combine to suggest that there is a statistical link between marketing time and
school quality variables. More comprehensive results are presented below.
Table 13 presents the key results of the school quality parameter estimates for the pooled
sample (1994-1998) and the boundary sample. The first two columns, labeled specification (1),
show the price equation and the TOM equation estimates from 2SLS analysis and neighborhood
controls drawn from census tract variables when we consider only the impact of test scores, test.
We then expand the model by adding other variables that describe student bodies’
socioeconomic characteristics. The final two columns, labeled specification (4) in Table 13,
show 2SLS results using boundary fixed effects in the price equation. For this analysis, we
determine the attendance boundaries for 60 elementary schools in East Baton Rouge Parish. We
follow Black (1999) and select only houses within a 0.35 mile buffer of the attendance boundary.
In this restricted sample there are 6,801 single family residences. The discussion that follows
refers to the results under specification (3) for the full sample and specification (4) for our
boundary sample.
The variables under School Attributes are the main variables of interest here. The
coefficient on the test scores in the price equation appears statistically insignificant across both
samples. However, in both models, we find that increasing test scores in a neighborhood school
results in shorter marketing time for houses in those attendance zones. Furthermore, the test
score coefficient in the TOM equation in our full sample, specification (3), suggests that
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increasing the test scores by one standard deviation, for the given selling price, above the mean
reduces marketing time by about two days, or just over 2.5 percent of average marketing time.58
No other school variable appears significant in the TOM equation in our full sample.
Looking at the boundary sample, specification (4) in the Table 13, all three of the school
variables in the TOM equation are significant. The level of significance varies from 1 percent
for students receiving free lunch to 10 percent for school racial composition. The coefficients on
these variables imply that higher test scores are associated with a shorter marketing time of a
little over three days for an increase in one standard deviation at the mean; higher percent black
in school is associated with a longer marketing time of about four days for an increase in one
standard deviation at the mean; and higher percent on free lunch is associated with a shorter
marketing time of about seven days for an increase in one standard deviation at the mean. In
addition, our boundary sample results using the simultaneous system indicate that the
representation of blacks in local public schools has no effect on property values after controlling
directly for test scores.59
Another interesting result concerns the percent of school-age children enrolled in private
schools. Recall, that in the hedonic price equation of Chapter III, we see that the coefficient on
this variable is negative, indicating a negative effect on property values, possibly because some
houses must be sold at discounted prices to capture the cost of private education. This result is
consistent across both full and boundary samples, price equation in specifications (3) and (4) in
Table 13, and it shows that one standard deviation increase in the percent enrollment in private
schools is associated with about a 0.64 percent decrease in housing prices. When looking at the

58

Seven percent of our sample has percent passing CRCT of 96.33 or higher.
Recall that the coefficient on the representation of blacks in local public schools was positive and significant at 10
percent in our hedonic price equation from the Chapter III.

59
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Table 13. 2SLS Regression Results 1994-1998 full sample:
Endogenous Variables: ln(sold price in ‘99$)
TOM (time-on-market in days)

Regressors
tom

(1)
lnsoldprR
-0.000293***
(0.000040)

lnsoldprR

School Attributes
test
black_school

tom

(2)
lnsoldprR
-0.000293***
(0.000040)

-15.59***
(3.62)

0.000296
(0.00037)

tom

-0.0831
(0.10)

-15.27***
(3.62)

0.000198
(0.00050)
-0.00426
(0.014)

-0.284**
(0.14)
-8.619**
(3.90)

Lunch_school

Observations
10640
10640
10640
10640
R-squared
0.87
0.55
0.87
0.55
Fixed Effects
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Exogenous
variables: test, black_school, lunch_school, ownerP, blackP, kidsP1, kidsP2, medHH99, enrollP,
num_beds, fullbath, livarea, netarea, LD, newLD, vacLD, competition, newCompetition,
vacCompetition.
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: house age, mls area, year, season and
month sold. Complete model estimates presented in the Appendix B.
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Table 13 (continued).

Regressors
tom

(3)
lnsoldprR
-0.000293***
(0.000040)

lnsoldprR

School Attributes
test
black_school
Lunch_school

tom

(4)
lnsoldprR
-0.000273***
(0.000048)

-15.87***
(3.63)

-0.000200
(0.00053)
0.0362
(0.024)
-0.0593**
(0.028)

tom

-0.358**
(0.15)
-0.790
(6.56)
-11.38
(7.68)

-12.92***
(4.60)

0.000671
(0.00074)
0.0400
(0.039)
-0.0312
(0.046)

-0.508**
(0.20)
17.84*
(10.4)
-33.56***
(12.4)

Observations
10640
10640
6801
6801
R-squared
0.87
0.55
0.88
0.60
Fixed Effects
Boundary
Boundary
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Exogenous
variables: test, black_school, lunch_school, ownerP, blackP, kidsP1, kidsP2, medHH99, enrollP,
num_beds, fullbath, livarea, netarea, LD, newLD, vacLD, competition, newCompetition,
vacCompetition.
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: house age, mls area, year, season and
month sold. Complete model estimates presented in the Appendix B.
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boundary fixed effects regression, specification (4), the coefficient suggests even larger impact
of private schools enrollment, about 1.85 percent. The TOM equation shows that the coefficient
on this variable is again negative, indicative of shorter marketing time for those houses. This
result is consistent across both specifications and it shows that for a given house selling price,
one standard deviation increase in the enrollment in private schools in a census tract is associated
with about 2 days shorter marketing time in our full sample, and about 3 days in our boundary
sample. Increase in the private enrollment could be capturing additional options of private
education. The availability of these options could make some locations more desirable increasing
a probability of receiving an offer at any given time.
Our results show that housing comparables enter the house pricing equation with the
expected sign. Increases in the living area, net area and the number of bathrooms increase the
price of a house, on average. The coefficient on TOM variable that measures time-on-market is
consistently negative and significant at a 1percent level in both samples. At the same time, the
TOM equation estimates show that increases in the living area (livarea) and number of
bathrooms (fullbath), while holding the size of the house constant, are associated with longer
marketing time.
The results in Table 13 yield some interesting observations about Neighborhood Market

Conditions. We show that vacant listing density, vacLD, enters the price equation with a
negative sign and it is significant at a 1 percent level. Consistent with Turnbull and Dombrow
(2006), this result suggests that a greater number of houses for sale in the neighborhood increases
the competition for potential buyers and reduces the likelihood of a match between a given house
and a potential buyer who is willing to offer more for that particular house. Looking at
marketing time in our boundary sample, the TOM equation, specification (4), we note positive
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and significant coefficients on all three competition variables indicating that having more houses
for sale in the neighborhood surrounding a given house lengthens the time it takes to sell that
house for a given price, other things equal.
Table 14 reports our findings based on school reassignments. The first two columns,
labeled specification (1) in the Table 14, show the price equation and the TOM equation
estimates from 2SLS analysis and neighborhood controls drawn from census tract variables when
we consider only the impact of change in categorical ranking and reassignments. We, then,
expend the model by adding other variables that capture student body’s socioeconomic
characteristics. As reported earlier, selling price is a function of days on the market, school
attributes, house characteristics, location attributes, broad market conditions, and neighborhood
housing market conditions. Similarly, the TOM equation is a function of selling price, school
attributes, house characteristics, location attributes, broad market conditions, and competition
that captures neighborhood housing market conditions. The reported 2SLS estimates take into
account the endogeneity of price and marketing time. The base group consists of houses that are
in the school attendance areas that have not changed their categorical ranking and have not been
re-assigned.
We focus our attention to the coefficients of variables under School Attributes. Instead of
test scores, we use a set of binary variables (SPS Improve, SPS Worse) that is equal to one if the
house is in the school attendance zone that has a positive/negative change to its categorical
performance measure. Many schools in the EBRSS have been low performing schools and we
have a reason to believe that buyers might be interested in trends in school quality.
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Table 14. 2SLS Regression Results 1999-2002: Endogenous Variables:

ln(sold price in ‘99$)
TOM (time-on-market in days)

Regressors
TOM

(1)
lnsoldprR
-0.0000592
(0.000065)

lnsoldprR

School Attributes
Sps Improve

tom

(2)
lnsoldprR

tom

-0.0000494
(0.000065)
-1.706
(3.39)

-3.677
(3.41)

2.366**
(1.09)
11.59***
(1.70)

0.0532***
(0.0060)
-0.00301
(0.0089)
0.165***
(0.033)

4.536***
(1.19)
9.587***
(1.76)
29.69***
(6.58)

reassign

0.00854
(0.0060)

-3.181***
(1.20)

0.00919
(0.0060)

Constant

10.82***
(0.024)
6414
0.86

62.35*
(35.8)
6414
0.55

10.82***
(0.024)
6414
0.86

BlackChange

-4.022
(3.42)

-2.998**
(1.19)

0.0528***
(0.0060)
0.000160
(0.0091)
0.242***
(0.056)
-0.107*
(0.062)
0.00825
(0.0060)

4.463***
(1.19)
10.47***
(1.79)
51.69***
(11.1)
-30.76**
(12.4)
-3.249***
(1.20)

83.62**
(36.0)
6414
0.55

10.82***
(0.024)
6414
0.86

88.24**
(36.1)
6414
0.55

freelunchChange

Observations
R-squared

tom

-0.0000482
(0.000065)

0.0419***
(0.0056)
0.00798
(0.0086)

Sps Worse

(3)
lnsoldprR

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Exogenous variables: sps
Improve, sps Worse, blackChange, freelunchChange, reassign, blackP, kidsP1, kidsP2,
medHH99, enrollP, num_beds, f_bath, livarea, netarea, LD, newLD, vacLD, competition,
newCompetition, vacCompetition.
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: house age, mls area, year, season and
month sold. Complete model estimates presented in the Appendix B.
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Using these variables allows us to look into not just short-term fluctuations in test scores
but also longer-term progress. We also use another binary variable that captures the change in
reassignments, reassign, that it is equal to one if the house has been reassigned to a different
school after the change in attendance boundaries in 2001. Recall that our results using the
hedonic price function of Chapter III indicate that holding other factors fixed, an improvement in
the categorical ranking of school performance is associated with a 5 percent increase in housing
prices. On the other hand, we find no penalty for schools that see a decline in their categorical
ranking. However, when we re-examine schools’ categorical rankings on simultaneous
determination of selling price and time-on-market, we note that houses located in the school
attendance areas that have changed their categorical ranking are also sold after longer marketing
time. Referring to the results reported in the specification (3) in the Table 14, a decline in
categorical ranking is predicted to lengthen the marketing time by 10 days. Interestingly, the
houses that are associated with schools that have an improved categorical ranking also see longer
marketing times by about four days. Yet, at the given selling price, if the house is reassigned to a
different school its marketing time is shorter by three days relative to a house that is not
reassigned.
One possible explanation is that reassignments affected mostly houses that belonged to
the attendance areas of previously overcrowded schools. Thus, the reassignment would indicate
that children are now placed in less congested schools.
Our findings, once again, suggest that the representation of blacks in local public schools
leads to an increase in property values after controlling directly for any changes in the school
categorical rankings. An increase of one standard deviation in percentage point black in a school
is associated with an increase of 1.9 percent in the house price, at the mean. At the same time,
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for a given selling price, the TOM equation shows changes in percentage point blacks in a school
by one standard deviation, or about 8 percent, are associated with longer marketing time, about 4
days, at the mean.
Consistent with the analysis based on the original school assignments, we again show that
housing comparables enter the house pricing equation with the expected sign. Increases in the
living area, net area and the number of bathrooms increase the price of a house, on average.
The results in Table 14 reinforce earlier conclusions about Neighborhood Market

Conditions. Here, we show that vacant listing density, vacLD, and new listing density, newLD,
enter the price equation with negative signs and the coefficients are significant at a 1 percent
level. Consistent with Turnbull and Dombrow (2006), this result suggests that a greater number
of newly listed and vacant houses for sale in the neighborhood increases the competition for
potential buyers and reduces the likelihood of a match between a given house and a potential
buyer who is willing to offer more for that particular house. Looking at marketing time, the
TOM equation in the specification (3) in the Table 14, we note positive and significant
coefficients on all but vacant competition variables, indicating that having more houses for sale
in the neighborhood surrounding a given house lengthens the time it takes to sell that house for a
given price, other things equal.

Conclusion
Hedonic value models have long been used in attempts to quantify the social
benefits/costs of locational amenities/disamenities. Most early hedonic studies employ crosssectional data, or at least data on a large number of housing transactions occurring over a
relatively short period of time to evaluate how changes in local amenities are reflected in house
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prices. The main assumption is that change in a local amenity reflects a change in a fundamental
value of an asset and is transmitted to the market through prices. In most models of asset prices,
time to sale is precisely zero. The real estate market does not appear to work this way. Krainer
(1999)shows that when the fundamental value of housing services changes, this change is
accompanied by a smaller change in a house price. Liquidity adjusts to make up the difference.
In another words, when house values decline, sellers are slow to drop their prices. In turn,
marketing time increases.60
We use a search model of the real estate market where prices and liquidity are determined
endogenously to show that when the value of housing services flows, neighborhood school
quality, is allowed to fluctuate, liquidity also fluctuates. For example, the model states that when
school quality is low, sellers do not necessarily drop their prices. Rather, prices are sticky
because sellers find it optimal to search for a buyer who attaches high value to the house based
on other comparables.
Using the data from East Baton Rouge Parish, we investigate school quality variables’
impact on the liquidity of the housing market through the housing service flow as recognized in
the theoretical model. We establish a statistical link between TOM and many neighborhood
market conditions.
For example, our analysis of original school assignment using the full sample shows no
statistical significance of any school variable but test scores in the TOM equation. Once we
focus on estimating differences in housing price effects near attendance zone boundaries we note

60

Fisher, Gatzlaff, Geltner and Haurin (2003) argue that slower relative reaction of sellers to changing market
conditions explains the relationship between prices and liquidity. The traditional explanation (Case & Shiller, 2003;
Genesove & Mayer, 1997) is that sellers “irrationally” refuse to recognize the decline in the value of their properties
and continue to wait for higher than market values. Another explanation (Genesove and Mayer, 1997) is based on
house sellers’ equity constraints.
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a stronger relationship between TOM and school variables. The results imply that higher test
scores are associated with shorter marketing time; higher percent black in school is associated
with longer marketing time; and higher percent on free lunch is associated with shorter
marketing time.
In summary, we find statistical support to earlier research on a tradeoff between an
acceptable price and the time a seller has a house on the market. Our empirical results show that
selling price declines with longer marketing time. Furthermore, we find statistical evidence that
the differences in transactions prices do not capture all of the differences in locational attributes.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
For many families with children, the most important factor they consider when buying a
house is that of school quality. The value homebuyers place on the education of their children
can be reveled by examining how much more people pay for houses in areas with better schools.
Does the quest for high-quality schools have a significant effect on house prices? Which school
characteristics do parents find most important when examining school quality? To answer these
questions, this dissertation used a unique data set from East Baton Rouge Parish school system in
Louisiana to provide the first empirical study that considers the impact of changes in school
quality on simultaneous determination of selling price and time-on-market.
The end to EBRPSS’s 47-year school desegregation case provided a rare opportunity to
study how a sudden exogenous change in public policy impacts the housing market. The end of
random school assignments and introduction of neighborhood schools followed by the
redistricting implemented by EBRPSS are a natural experiment in education policy. The school
district was operating under a court-imposed desegregation order. This desegregation order
caused changes in the housing market locational amenities in the form of test scores and school
demographic composition. Such exogenous change allowed us to use classical statistical theory
that works only if variations in data occur randomly. The uniqueness of our data set and
empirical methodology avoid common difficulties in housing market studies. While looking
within one school district enabled us to eliminate variations in property tax rates, school
spending, and other public services, two different sources of variation along boundaries of school
attendance zones and following the change in school assignments provided for an ideal situation
to study the effects of school quality measures and racial composition on housing prices.
Similarly, controls for the localized housing market supply and demand conditions ensured that
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price and time-on-market equations are identified in the 2SLS estimation, and removed a
potential source of spatial correlation in housing data.
In the second chapter, we described EBRPSS’s 88 schools and gave a brief history of the
school system’s battle with desegregation law suits from 1956 to 2003. In 1981, U.S. District
Judge John Parker designed and ordered a desegregation plan that led quickly to a mass flight of
8,000 white students with many more to follow, which further complicated the desegregation
plan. What was once a majority white school system, became a majority black school system.
Due to these events, the school system changed dramatically as it operated under random school
assignments. The 1996 Consent Decree eliminated random school assignments and created new
“community sensitive” attendance zones. These events provided a rare opportunity to study the
impact of changes in school assignments and school quality as measured by test scores, and
racial composition on housing prices and time-on-market.
In the third chapter, we used the hedonic price model and conventional capitalization
theory to measure the value of better schools. We followed Black’s (1999) approach and used the
boundary fixed effects technique to minimize the likelihood that omitted neighborhood
characteristics are driving the results of the estimation. We also considered the impact of peers
and included variables such as school racial composition and percent of students on free-lunch.
The housing market reveals that the type of grading system used or the indicators of quality can
have a large effect on property values. For example, our findings based on the initial school
assignments show that the housing market does not seem to be sensitive to increases in test
scores. On the other hand, our examination of school categorical rankings indicate that, holding
other factors fixed, an improvement in categorical ranking of school performance is associated
with a 5.61 percent increase in housing prices. At the same time, we observe no penalty for
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schools that see a decline in their categorical ranking. Furthermore, our study indicates that in
considering a neighborhood with a less elastic supply of housing, concentrated mostly in a
central city, the improved categorical ranking of a school is associated with a 7.8 percent
increase in the house price. At the mean, this is equivalent to $9,227 (the mean house price in
this sub-sample is $118,300). Similarly, there is a penalty equivalent to a 5.5 percent of house
price associated with houses in the schools that saw a decrease in their categorical ranking
relative to those houses that saw no change in their school rankings. This result implies that
central city house values are more elastic with respect to improvements in elementary school
categorical rankings. Thus, improving elementary schools has a great potential for increasing
house values, and, as a consequence, revenue from property taxes.
In the fourth chapter, we called attention to the problem of readjustment to the
equilibrium following some environmental shock. In the short run, the supply of owner
occupied housing is fixed and the market response to demand shocks should be symmetric:
positive shocks result in price increases and negative shocks result in price decreases. However,
housing markets typically respond to large negative demand shocks with long periods during
which asset liquidity declines but house prices change relatively little. Thus, we accounted for
the simultaneity of the time-price relationship by using the 2SLS to re-estimate the hedonic price
models from the third chapter.
Using the data from East Baton Rouge Parish, we investigated how school quality
impacts the liquidity of the housing market, through the housing service flow as established in
the theoretical model. The empirical evidence produced by this study indicates that there is state
dependant illiquidity. Of course, the empirical evidence offered here is relevant to only one
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housing market. Future research could focus on the impact of school quality on simultaneous
determination of selling price and time-on-market in the different metropolitan areas.
Two main areas for additional research concern school quality measures and time-onmarket. Given the unique data, future research needs to incorporate the availability of
intradistrict school choice. For example, the availability of choice programs contributes to
underestimation of school quality capitalization since it gives parents living outside of their
desired school attendance area the choice to send their child to any school within the school
district. Similarly, when attendance boundaries were first determined, the district made every
“reasonable good-faith effort” to desegregate the system while considering the size of the school,
the distribution of students by grade level, natural boundaries, and, in some cases, family
economics and neighborhoods. However, the original boundaries were not meeting the
requirements spelled in the Consent Decree of 1996 and were redrawn in 2001. As a result of
reassignments some students do not attend schools
closest to their neighborhoods. Future research needs to investigate the impact of distance to the
elementary school.61
It is possible to argue that the house and neighborhood characteristics collected in this
dataset are not the most important characteristics. A different set of characteristics, such as
nearby amenities, influence price and liquidity, but remain unobservable to the researcher. The
same exercise can be repeated using a different amenity such as the level of crime in the area. In
addition, study can be extended across time to determine if the results generated here are stable
in different market conditions.

61

Kane et al. (2003) find that an additional mile in distance from the elementary school was associated with a 1 to 5
percentage point decline in housing values. This outcome is equivalent to the effect associated with one standard
deviation difference in test scores.
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Finally, a critique of our empirical work is due to non-normality of the marketing time
duration distribution, since duration is positive by construct. An empirical method that
circumvents this problem is survival regression, or duration analysis. The significant difference
between the OLS and survival regression is that a researcher is allowed to select a distribution
for the error term in survival regression. The exponential or Weibull distributions are usually
chosen for this application.
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Appendix A: Attendance District Boundaries
The most important feature of attendance boundaries that make them useful for this
estimation is that they are unchanging. The existence of this feature is what homeowners use
when forming their expectations about the local school. It is plausible that, since the attendance
boundaries were drawn in August of 1996, EBR homeowners do not have enough time to
evaluate the information about local schools and include that information in their pricing
decisions. Similarly, according to school district administrators, when attendance boundaries
were first determined, the district made every “reasonable good-faith effort” to desegregate the
system while considering the size of the school, the distribution of students by grade level,
natural boundaries, and, in some cases, family economics and neighborhoods. Anecdotal
evidence points that the boundaries, once drawn, were not meeting the requirements spelled in
the Consent Decree and needed to be redrawn. For example, on September 27, 1996, shortly
after the Decree was implemented, The Board sought permission to exceed the proposed
enrollment in 17 schools. Similar motions were filed on September 24, 1997 and October 23,
1998. It became apparent that the Board will have to redraw the boundaries in order to comply
with Consent Decree requirements. We use this implication of instability of the boundary sample
and look at the school quality capitalization while excluding the boundary sample. There are
3,835 observations in this sample. The mean house value in this sample is $129,169. Table A1
reports parameter estimates on key variables. Even after such an exercise, we do not find any
evidence of test score capitalization.
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Table A1. Regression Results Dependent Variable: ln(sold price in ‘99$)

Regressors

test

(1)BASELINE
HEDONIC
Neighborhood
Controls from
Census Tracts

(2)BASELINE
HEDONIC
Neighborhood
Controls from Local
Market Conditions

-0.00169
-0.00164
(0.0010)
(0.0010)
black_school
-0.0309
-0.0358
(0.046)
(0.047)
Lunch_school
-0.00713
-0.00329
(0.054)
(0.056)
Observations
3835
3835
R-squared
0.88
0.88
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients are not
reported for the following variables: House Attributes, Tract Attributes, house age, mls area, year
and season sold.
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Appendix B: Regression Results with Complete Estimates
Table B1. Regression Results: Proxy for Land Supply Elasticity is New Construction in the

Census Tract, 1994-1998
Dependent Variable: ln(sold price in ’99 $)

Regressors
School Attributes
Test
black_school
lunch_school

House Attributes
TOM
num_beds
Fullbath
Livarea
Netarea

Tract Attributes
ownerP
blackP
kidsP1
kidsP2
medHH99
enrollP
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1)FULL
SAMPLE
lnsoldprR

(2) NEW
HOUSING <.25
lnsoldprR

(3) NEW
HOUSING >=.25
lnsoldprR

-0.000246
(0.00061)
0.0362
(0.025)
-0.0629**
(0.030)

-0.00112
(0.00069)
-0.0208
(0.030)
-0.0541
(0.037)

0.000250
(0.0011)
0.249***
(0.040)
-0.125**
(0.051)

-0.000253***
(0.000027)
0.00143
(0.0041)
0.0194***
(0.0051)
0.472***
(0.0065)
0.151***
(0.0080)

-0.000284***
(0.000034)
0.00485
(0.0050)
0.0280***
(0.0061)
0.432***
(0.0075)
0.142***
(0.0090)

-0.000194***
(0.000040)
0.00287
(0.0068)
-0.00674
(0.0084)
0.548***
(0.012)
0.156***
(0.016)

-0.0997***
(0.017)
0.0135
(0.017)
0.115
(0.13)
-0.487***
(0.079)
0.00502***
(0.00033)
-0.0741***
(0.027)
10.70***
(0.019)
10640
0.87

-0.129***
(0.030)
0.0571***
(0.021)
0.0184
(0.25)
-0.897***
(0.11)
0.00640***
(0.00057)
-0.133***
(0.030)
10.78***
(0.030)
7171
0.85

-0.173***
(0.049)
-0.295***
(0.054)
-0.467
(0.49)
0.939***
(0.35)
-0.000124
(0.00073)
0.00532
(0.073)
10.75***
(0.041)
3469
0.91
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Table B2. Regression Results: Proxy for Land Supply Elasticity is New Construction in the

Census Tract, 1999-2002
Dependent Variable: ln(sold price in ’99 $)

Regressors
School
Attributes
sps Improve
sps Worse
blackChange
freelunchChange
Reassign

Tract Attributes
blackP
kidsP1
kidsP2
medHH99
enrollP

House Attributes
TOM
num_beds
Fullbath
Livarea
Netarea
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(1) FULL
SAMPLE
lnsoldprR

(2) NEW HOUSING
<.25
lnsoldprR

(3) NEW HOUSING
>=.25
lnsoldprR

0.0516***
(0.0070)
-0.000666
(0.0093)
0.222***
(0.058)
-0.0948
(0.061)
0.00940*
(0.0056)

0.0779***
(0.011)
-0.0548***
(0.017)
0.474***
(0.088)
-0.193**
(0.077)
0.0226***
(0.0071)

0.0583***
(0.022)
0.0126
(0.012)
-0.488**
(0.25)
-0.337
(0.54)
0.144***
(0.053)

0.0136
(0.023)
0.275
(0.17)
-0.406***
(0.11)
0.00398***
(0.00034)
-0.00994
(0.034)

0.0917***
(0.026)
0.122
(0.31)
-0.791***
(0.13)
0.00548***
(0.00045)
-0.0617
(0.038)

-0.358***
(0.063)
0.868
(0.65)
0.0274
(0.29)
-0.00262***
(0.00061)
0.688***
(0.11)

-0.000163***
(0.000045)
0.00236
(0.0050)
0.0274***
(0.0066)
0.426***
(0.0084)
0.135***
(0.0099)
10.82***
(0.025)
6414
0.86

-0.000185***
(0.000055)
0.00289
(0.0058)
0.0318***
(0.0076)
0.413***
(0.0098)
0.128***
(0.011)
10.82***
(0.042)
4544
0.84

-0.0000884
(0.000065)
0.00485
(0.0100)
0.0145
(0.012)
0.432***
(0.016)
0.144***
(0.020)
11.12***
(0.068)
1870
0.91
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Table B3. 2SLS Regression Results 1994-1998: Endogenous Variables:

ln(sold price in ‘99$)
TOM (time-on-market in days)

Regressors
tom

(1)
lnsoldprR
-0.000293***
(0.000040)

lnsoldprR
School Attributes
test

tom

fullbath
livarea
netarea
Tract Attributes
ownerP
blackP
kidsP1
kidsP2
medHH99
enrollP

tom

-0.000293***
(0.000040)
-15.59***
(3.62)

-15.27***
(3.62)

0.000296
(0.00037)

-0.0831
(0.10)

0.000198
(0.00050)
-0.00426
(0.014)

-0.284**
(0.14)
-8.619**
(3.90)

0.00170
(0.0035)
0.0192***
(0.0042)
0.471***
(0.0048)
0.151***
(0.0065)

-1.291
(0.95)
4.211***
(1.15)
21.14***
(2.07)
-4.674**
(1.88)

0.00168
(0.0035)
0.0192***
(0.0042)
0.471***
(0.0048)
0.151***
(0.0065)

-1.330
(0.95)
4.174***
(1.15)
21.07***
(2.07)
-4.800**
(1.88)

-0.0968***
(0.017)
0.0186
(0.015)
0.128
(0.13)
-0.506***
(0.074)
0.00513***
(0.00030)
-0.0771***
(0.021)

-10.98**
(4.63)
-11.98***
(4.00)
-25.97
(34.9)
73.92***
(20.4)
-0.250***
(0.084)
-18.98***
(5.74)

-0.0963***
(0.017)
0.0201
(0.016)
0.125
(0.13)
-0.510***
(0.076)
0.00513***
(0.00030)
-0.0766***
(0.021)

-9.931**
(4.65)
-8.810**
(4.25)
-31.36
(35.0)
65.84***
(20.8)
-0.238***
(0.084)
-18.04***
(5.76)

black_school
Lunch_school
House Attributes
num_beds

(2)
lnsoldprR
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Table B3 (continued).

Regressors
Neighborhood Market Conditions
LD
newLD
vacLD

(1)
lnsoldprR

-0.00162
(0.0013)
0.00261
(0.0021)
-0.00667***
(0.0019)

competition

vacCompetition

Observations
R-squared

10.74***
(0.019)
10640
0.87

tom

-0.00162
(0.0013)
0.00262
(0.0021)
-0.00664***
(0.0019)
-0.00744*
(0.0042)
0.169***
(0.0052)
0.0511***
(0.0039)

newCompetition

Constant

tom

(2)
lnsoldprR

199.6***
(37.8)
10640
0.55

-0.00724*
(0.0042)
0.169***
(0.0052)
0.0512***
(0.0039)
10.74***
(0.019)
10640
0.87

195.9***
(37.8)
10640
0.55

Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Exogenous
variables: test, black_school, lunch_school, ownerP, blackP, kidsP1, kidsP2, medHH99, enrollP,
num_beds, fullbath, livarea, netarea, LD, newLD, vacLD, competition, newCompetition,
vacCompetition.
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: house age, mls area, year, season and
month sold.
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Table B4. 2SLS Regression Results 1994-1998: Endogenous Variables:

ln(sold price in ‘99$)
TOM (time-on-market in days)

Regressors
Tom

(3)
lnsoldprR
-0.000293***
(0.000040)

lnsoldprR

School Attributes
Test
black_school
Lunch_school

House Attributes
num_beds
Fullbath
Livarea
Netarea

Tract Attributes
ownerP
blackP
kidsP1
kidsP2
medHH99
enrollP

tom

(4)
lnsoldprR

tom

-0.000273***
(0.000048)
-15.87***
(3.63)

-12.92***
(4.60)

-0.000200
(0.00053)
0.0362
(0.024)
-0.0593**
(0.028)

-0.358**
(0.15)
-0.790
(6.56)
-11.38
(7.68)

0.000671
(0.00074)
0.0400
(0.039)
-0.0312
(0.046)

-0.508**
(0.20)
17.84*
(10.4)
-33.56***
(12.4)

0.00160
(0.0035)
0.0194***
(0.0042)
0.472***
(0.0048)
0.151***
(0.0065)

-1.338
(0.95)
4.231***
(1.15)
21.36***
(2.07)
-4.735**
(1.88)

0.0198***
(0.0043)
0.00634
(0.0051)
0.449***
(0.0060)
0.149***
(0.0079)

0.693
(1.15)
3.455**
(1.35)
17.09***
(2.53)
-3.865*
(2.27)

-0.101***
(0.017)
0.0120
(0.016)
0.141
(0.13)
-0.502***
(0.076)
0.00507***
(0.00030)
-0.0765***
(0.021)

-10.82**
(4.69)
-10.30**
(4.36)
-27.64
(35.0)
66.64***
(20.8)
-0.247***
(0.084)
-18.06***
(5.76)

-0.260***
(0.026)
0.00443
(0.029)
-0.232
(0.23)
-0.0135
(0.13)
0.00616***
(0.00042)
-0.127***
(0.029)

5.919
(6.98)
5.728
(7.81)
56.89
(61.0)
5.280
(34.5)
-0.138
(0.12)
-33.01***
(7.74)
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Table B4 (continued).

Regressors
Neighborhood Market Conditions
LD
newLD
vacLD

(3)
lnsoldprR

-0.00146
(0.0013)
0.00258
(0.0021)
-0.00665***
(0.0019)

Competition

vacCompetition

Observations
R-squared
Fixed Effects

10.74***
(0.019)
10640
0.87

tom

0.000227
(0.0016)
0.00121
(0.0026)
-0.0131***
(0.0025)
-0.00695*
(0.0042)
0.168***
(0.0052)
0.0512***
(0.0039)

newCompetition

Constant

tom

(4)
lnsoldprR

203.1***
(37.9)
10640
0.55

0.0211***
(0.0052)
0.142***
(0.0064)
0.0553***
(0.0051)
10.78***
(0.16)
6801
0.88
Boundary

118.9*
(64.7)
6801
0.60
Boundary

Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Exogenous
variables: test, black_school, lunch_school, ownerP, blackP, kidsP1, kidsP2, medHH99, enrollP,
num_beds, fullbath, livarea, netarea, LD, newLD, vacLD, competition, newCompetition,
vacCompetition.
Coefficients are not reported for the following variables: house age, mls area, year, season and
month sold.
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Table B5. 2SLS Regression Results 1999-2002: Endogenous Variables:

ln(sold price in ‘99$)
TOM (time-on-market in days)

Regressors
TOM

(1)
lnsoldprR
-0.0000592
(0.000065)

lnsoldprR

School Attributes
Sps Improve
Sps Worse

tom

(2)
lnsoldprR

tom

-0.0000494
(0.000065)
-1.706
(3.39)

-3.677
(3.41)

2.366**
(1.09)
11.59***
(1.70)

0.0532***
(0.0060)
-0.00301
(0.0089)
0.165***
(0.033)

4.536***
(1.19)
9.587***
(1.76)
29.69***
(6.58)

0.00854
(0.0060)

-3.181***
(1.20)

0.00919
(0.0060)

House Attributes
num_beds

0.00320
(0.0043)
0.0274***
(0.0052)
0.424***
(0.0062)
0.137***
(0.0081)

-1.358
(0.86)
-1.430
(1.04)
9.111***
(1.79)
-1.898
(1.70)

0.00263
(0.0043)
0.0274***
(0.0051)
0.425***
(0.0061)
0.136***
(0.0081)

f_bath
livarea
netarea

-4.022
(3.42)

-2.998**
(1.19)

0.0528***
(0.0060)
0.000160
(0.0091)
0.242***
(0.056)
-0.107*
(0.062)
0.00825
(0.0060)

4.463***
(1.19)
10.47***
(1.79)
51.69***
(11.1)
-30.76**
(12.4)
-3.249***
(1.20)

-1.439*
(0.86)
-1.368
(1.04)
9.991***
(1.80)
-1.766
(1.70)

0.00211
(0.0044)
0.0277***
(0.0051)
0.425***
(0.0061)
0.136***
(0.0081)

-1.584*
(0.86)
-1.264
(1.04)
10.23***
(1.80)
-1.734
(1.70)

freelunchChange
reassign

tom

-0.0000482
(0.000065)

0.0419***
(0.0056)
0.00798
(0.0086)

BlackChange

(3)
lnsoldprR

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Exogenous variables: sps
Improve, sps Worse, blackChange, freelunchChange, reassign, blackP, kidsP1, kidsP2,
medHH99, enrollP, num_beds, f_bath, livarea, netarea, LD, newLD, vacLD, competition,
newCompetition, vacCompetition. Coefficients are not reported for the following variables:
house age, mls area, year, season and month sold.
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Table B5 (continued).

Regressors
Tract Attributes
blackP
kidsP1
kidsP2
medHH99
enrollP

Neighborhood
Market
Conditions
LD
newLD
vacLD

(1)
lnsoldprR

0.0115
(0.019)
0.510***
(0.15)
-0.446***
(0.094)
0.00407***
(0.00030)
-0.0232
(0.026)

0.00806
(0.019)
0.254
(0.16)
-0.364***
(0.096)
0.00386***
(0.00030)
-0.0205
(0.026)

vacCompetition

10.82***
(0.024)
6414
0.86

tom

-6.475*
(3.79)
-100.2***
(32.3)
0.328
(19.1)
-0.214***
(0.061)
-3.637
(5.26)

0.00698***
(0.0021)
-0.0069***
(0.0026)
-0.00624**
(0.0024)
0.103***
(0.0050)
0.118***
(0.0056)
-0.102***
(0.0053)

newCompetition

Observations
R-squared

-6.030
(3.79)
-55.78*
(30.9)
-13.20
(18.9)
-0.188***
(0.061)
-4.045
(5.27)

0.00571***
(0.0020)
-0.00650**
(0.0026)
-0.00506**
(0.0024)

competition

Constant

tom

(2)
lnsoldprR

62.35*
(35.8)
6414
0.55

(3)
lnsoldprR

0.0153
(0.020)
0.286*
(0.16)
-0.428***
(0.10)
0.00398***
(0.00031)
-0.0151
(0.026)

-4.346
(3.88)
-90.27***
(32.6)
-18.66
(20.6)
-0.175***
(0.063)
-2.063
(5.29)

0.00721***
(0.0021)
-0.0069***
(0.0026)
-0.0065***
(0.0024)
0.105***
(0.0050)
0.117***
(0.0056)
-0.104***
(0.0053)

10.82***
(0.024)
6414
0.86

tom

83.62**
(36.0)
6414
0.55

0.106***
(0.0050)
0.117***
(0.0056)
-0.105***
(0.0053)
10.82***
(0.024)
6414
0.86

88.24**
(36.1)
6414
0.55

Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Exogenous variables: sps
Improve, sps Worse, blackChange, freelunchChange, reassign, blackP, kidsP1, kidsP2,
medHH99, enrollP, num_beds, f_bath, livarea, netarea, LD, newLD, vacLD, competition,
newCompetition, vacCompetition. Coefficients are not reported for the following variables:
house age, mls area, year, season and month sold.
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Appendix C: Regression Results with School Performance Score as Independent Variable
The empirical hedonic price function defined in Chapter III is as follows:

ln( Pinkt ) = α + δZ kt + Γ ink + ω t + ε inkt
Here, we estimate our model specification where Zkt elements are the year-specific school level
attributes such as school performance score, percent black and percent receiving free lunch.
Table 2C presents the coefficients on key variables.
We find no capitalization of performance scores. Again, we attribute this to many
changes that EBRPSS has been through because of its battle with school desegregation law suits.
As noted earlier, anecdotal evidence points to the fact that the boundaries, once drawn, were not
meeting the requirements spelled in the Consent Decree and needed to be redrawn. These
developments can impact homebuyers’ expectations. It is not surprising that test scores are not
capitalized, in part, because homebuyers are uncertain about future policy changes. In addition,
there is a great deal of volatility in test scores and the way they are reported. For example, the
Louisiana Department of Education reported LEAP 21 and The Iowa Tests scores separately
before the Louisiana School Accountability Program was established. As part of the
accountability system, each school annually receives a School Performance Score (SPS), which
indicates how well its students perform. Specifically, each school’s effectiveness and progress
are measured as a weighted composite index using results from state wide testing programs: 60
percent weight for the LEAP 21 tests, 30 percent weight for the Iowa Tests, and 10 percent
weight for the attendance and dropout index. School Performance Labels are assigned based on
this score. Table C1 lists six performance categories.
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Table C1. 2000-2001 School Performance Label Assignment

School Performance Label

SPS Range

School of Academic Excellence

150.0 or above

School of Academic Distinction

125.0 – 149.9

School of Academic Achievement

100.0 – 124.9

Academically Above the State Average

79.9 – 99.9

Academically Below the State Average

30.1 – 99.9

Academically Unacceptable School

30 or Below
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The distribution of the school performance labels gives an indication of a low performing school
district. For example, there are no schools of academic excellence in the district and only 1
percent of this district’s elementary schools are Schools of Academic Distinction, while 57
percent of the district elementary schools are labeled Academically Below the State Average.
These numbers are calculated based on elementary schools. Schools with grades 9-12 and 9-12
portions of K-12 schools (i.e., high school and combination schools) officially entered the
Louisiana School Accountability System in the fall of 2001. Also, The Louisiana Department of
Education uses a two-year accountability cycle. During each cycle, every school receives an
SPS and a Growth SPS, which is calculated at the end of a cycle and is used to determine if a
school has achieved its Growth Target. All schools also receive an annual growth target and are
expected to reach a score of 120 by the 2013-14 school year. The Louisiana Department of
Education reports that the performance of EBR schools has improved since the implementation
of this plan. The average SPS for elementary schools in EBR increased five points from 1999 to
2004. As suggested by Kane et al. (2003), in such environment, a school that is improving has a
difficult time signaling that improvement to the buyers in the housing market. Many schools in
the EBRSS have been low performing schools, and we have reason to believe that buyers might
be interested in trends in school quality.
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Table C2. Regression Results Dependent Variable: ln(sold price in ‘99$)

Regressors

School Attributes
School Performance
Score
black_school
freelunch_school

(1)Baseline Hedonic
Level Values
Neighborhood
Controls from Census
Tracts

(2)Baseline Hedonic
Level Values
Neighborhood
Controls from Local
market Conditions

0.000396

0.000340

0.000810***

(0.00046)
0.116***
(0.037)
-0.139**
(0.055)

(0.00047)
0.114***
(0.037)
-0.145***
(0.055)

(0.00025)

sps Improve
sps Worse
blackChange
freelunchChange
reassign
Constant
Observations
R-squared

(3) Baseline Hedonic
Categorical Rankings
Neighborhood
Controls from Local
market Conditions

0.0115**
(0.0057)
10.81***
(0.066)
6610
0.86

0.0110*
(0.0057)
10.83***
(0.067)
6610
0.86

0.0553***
(0.0072)
-0.00374
(0.0094)
0.153**
(0.062)
0.0182
(0.073)
0.0111**
(0.0057)
10.76***
(0.034)
6414
0.86

Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Coefficients are not
reported for the following variables: Tract Attributes, House Attributes, house age, mls area, year
and season sold.
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Appendix D: Theoretical Model and Calibration Exercise
To evaluate what happens when the houses in the market have different amenity levels
such as school quality attached to them, we redefine the housing service flow to consist of an
idiosyncratic component λ and an aggregate component x,
d =λ + x.

(1)

The idiosyncratic component λ has the same interpretation as before. The state
variable x is aggregate in that all agents who live in houses receive exactly the same x.
The variable x can reflect the aggregate state of the economy such as employment growth
and interest rates. Under this interpretation, shocks to the productivity of the land or to
job growth filter their way into house prices through x. A more concrete interpretation of

x could include amenity levels such as school quality or the level of crime in the area.
Under this interpretation, changes to a location-specific component in the housing service
that reflects the value of land filters into house price through x. By adding a random
variable x to the housing service flow, the equations above that define equilibrium
become functions of x.
For simplicity, assume that x can take on just two values, low and high (L,H). The
evolution of x is described by a Markov chain with the transition matrix
1−α⎤
⎡ α
M =⎢
α ⎥⎦
⎣1 − α
Additionally, let q be the expected value of having a house on the market and let
µ(p) be the probability that a house will sell when the list price is p. The seller chooses a
price to solve

q( x ) = max p {µ ( p ) p + (1 − µ ( p )) β Eq(x ′)}

for x = x L , x H .

(1)
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The first part states that with probability µ the seller receives the asking price for the house. The
second part relates to the possibility of re-listing the house in the next period. The seller puts the
house back on the market and tries to sell it again in the next period. Here, the parameter β is a
discount factor.
The first order condition that gives the optimal price p is
dµ
( p( x ) − β Eq( x′)) + µ ( p) = 0
dp

for x = x L , x H .

(2)

The selling price of housing, p(x), and the expected value of having a house on the
market, q(x), are determined in equations (1)–(2) in terms of µ, the probability of sale
function.
We now consider the optimal behavior for the agent in his role as buyer. We start first
with an agent who currently has a “match” and will consume the housing service flow λ at the
beginning of the next period. After this period, the homeowner will continue to consume λ if the
match persists for another period, an event that happens with probability π. If, on the other hand,
the match fails, the agent must put the house on the market and begin to search again, an event
that happens with probability 1 – π. Define v(λ,x) to be the lifetime expected utility of owning a
house yielding service flow λ, then

ν (λ , x) = β E ( x ′ + λ + πν ( x ′, λ ) + (1 − π )(q( x ′) + s( x ′))) for x = x L , x H .

(3)

The first and the second part of the equation state that an agent will consume housing
service flow with certainty for the first period and with the probability of π for the second period.
The third part relates to the house selling process, which we saw above, yields q in expected
value. The agent also has an option to search for a new house at this point. The value of this
search option is represented by s.
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Under the optimal buy rule the agent buys the house with service flow λ for price p only
if the expected value of the house net of price is greater than the option to search again next
period. That is,

ν ( x, λ ) − p( x ′) ≥ βEs( x ′)

for x = x L , x H .

(4)

Since v is linear and strictly increasing in λ(x) there exists a λ*(x) such that a searching agent is
indifferent between buying a house for the asking price p and searching again next period. That
is, there exists an λ* (x) such that

ν ( x, λ *) − p( x ′) = β Es( x ′) .

for x = x L , x H .

(5)

A buyer keeps searching if she draws λ< λ* and buys if she draws λ>λ*. Therefore, we can
write the expected value of search as
⎛1
⎞
s ( x ) = F (λ * ( x )) β s( x ) + (1 − F (λ * (x )))⎜⎜ ∫ν ( x, λ )dF (λ ) − p( x)) ⎟⎟
⎝π*
⎠

for x = x L , x H . (6)

Here, the probability of sale is simply the probability of drawing λ>λ*. Given that F is the
uniform distribution on [0,1] so that µ = 1 – F(λ*), or

µ (x ) = 1 − λ * (x )

for x = x L , x H .

(7)

The equilibrium is a symmetric Nash equilibrium: an equilibrium in which each agent’s
decision rules are best responses to the same decision rules when adopted by other agents. The
equilibrium is a price of housing p(x), an expectation of the value of a house on the market q(x),
an expectation of the outcome from the search process s(x), a reservation service flow λ*(x), and
a belief about the probability that a buyer will purchase a house µ(x) when the price is p for
x = x L , x H . All these variables must satisfy equations (1), (2), (5), (6), and (7). Given the
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assumptions that there are two states of x, the model is solved by solving a system of 10
equations and 10 unknowns. These equations can be solved numerically.
Two most important parameters in this model are the match persistence parameter or
π, and the state persistence parameter α. Given these parameters Krainer (2002) shows that when
buyer valuations are high, sellers raise their prices in response to the increased valuations of
buyers. It is also revealed that valuations of houses by potential buyers vary more across
different states of the economy than do prices. Thus, changes in underlying value of property are
not fully reflected in transaction prices. Rather, liquidity absorbs part of the capitalization of
school quality.
Krainer (2002) performs a simple calibration exercise and looks at the differences across
states between prices, valuations, and market liquidity. In his exercise, the match persistence
parameter, π, and the state persistence parameter, α, are both equal to 0.9968. This value implies
that expected time to match failure and expected time until a change in state variable x equal to
six years. Using these parameter values, the model predicts that prices in the high dividend state
are 4.7 percent higher than in the low dividend state. However, liquidity is shown to be affected
much more than prices. In particular, the probability of sale in any given week in a high
dividend state is about 18 percent higher than in the low dividend state.
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